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ARMENIA 2012 A YEAR OF CHOICES
This is the fifth year that 
Civilitas looks back at the year 
past and attempts to assess 
the events and trends within 
Armenia, and around us. It is 
always a challenge not to reduce 
this annual publication to a 
list of events. The intent is to 
focus on trends and institutional 
change. Each year, however, 
it becomes harder to say 
something new given the slow 
process of institutional change.
2012 was different only in that there were more 
choices to be made — by the people and by 
the rulers.  Neighbors to the north made those 
choices and are living with the consequences, 
sometimes surprising, but comfortable in the 
knowledge that the choices were theirs.
In Armenia, in a year that was both an election 
year and a pre-election year, there were choices 
to be made by the various political players — to 
seriously collaborate and compete, or to do the 
minimum necessary to remain a player. There 
were choices for the ruling party — to prepare 
for elections by responding to electors’ needs 
or merely pretending. There were choices for 
those in government — to nurture a competitive 
economic environment with room for everyone, 
or to focus on limiting the field and collecting 
the crumbs. There were similar choices to be 
made by the business elite — to profit legally and 
contribute to the public sector, or to continue 
to profit illegally and live at the expense of 
the public sector. Within the neighborhood and 
on the global stage, the choices were between 
visionary engagement and reactive rhetoric. 
Finally, the active segment of the public, too, had 
choices to make — which battles to fight, which 
alliances to make.  
In the resultant disappointed environment, the 
people, too, made choices. They had two ways 
of responding to disappointment. The Economist 
Albert Hirschmann said either ‘with their feet or 
by staying put and complaining.’ This year, many 
chose the first. Those who chose the second did 
so half-heartedly, without hope.  
With two exceptions. First, those seeking greater 
political power and responsibility managed to 
get past the inability and plain refusal to reach 
out and collaborate with others seeking change, 
albeit differently. Second, a small new group, 
who proudly claimed no interest in politics, 
nevertheless were both vocal, active and 
demanding.
There will be more choices to make in the year to 
come — in Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
Then, the peoples in each of these societies will 
have to demonstrate that they want the right to 
make choices and will defend that right.
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The intensifying civil war in 
Syria, its impact on Turkey, 
and the Iran-Israel standoff 
dominated the region in 2012, 
eclipsing less visible problems 
in the Caucasus and distracting 
attention from incipient shifts in 
policy in the wake of the regime 
change in Georgia.
Just 500 km away as the crow flies, the Arab 
Spring had hit a wall in Syria, where the nearly-
two-year-long struggle showed no signs of 
abating. Indeed, in the absence of overt Western 
aid, the public support to the rebels offered by 
Turkey and some Gulf countries, and on the other 
hand support to the regime from Russia and Iran, 
seemed to do nothing to accelerate a resolution. 
Instead, refugees from Syria found their way to 
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, the North Caucasus, 
Armenia, even Georgia in smaller numbers.
In the immediate neighborhood, the role-
switching between Russian leaders Vladimir 
Putin and Dmitry Medvedev did not of itself 
trigger any changes in Moscow’s policy towards 
the Caucasus. But the advent to power in Georgia 
as a result of the October parliamentary election 
of Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream coalition 
was seen as the start of a more pragmatic and 
realistic approach on Tbilisi’s part to relations 
with Russia in general and the North Caucasus 
in particular. Ivanishvili named as his special 
representative for talks with Moscow former 
Ambassador to Russia Zurab Abashidze, whose 
first meeting in mid-December in Geneva with 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigorii Karasin 
both sides termed constructive and heralding the 
start of a new dialogue.  
Ivanishvili, reputedly the richest Georgian in 
the world, was denied Georgian citizenship by 
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, ostensibly 
because he already held French and Russian 
citizenship. Nevertheless, Ivanishvili’s Georgian 
Dream was elected in a contest that was broadly 
perceived as free and fair by domestic and 
international observers alike, and a new beginning 
in the post-Soviet space.
After his party’s win, he was granted Georgian 
citizenship and became prime minister by decision 
of the Georgian Parliament, where his party now 
holds a majority. Given the Georgian constitutional 
changes passed in 2010, following the inauguration 
of the new president in October 2013, the powers 
of the president will be significantly reduced in 
favor of the prime minister.  
Ivanishvili has since walked a fine line between 
promised change and inevitable continuity. He 
declared that Georgia should participate in the 
2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The previous 
leadership had planned to boycott the games. 
Ivanishvili also closed the PIK TV channel that 
was perceived as an anti-Russian channel which 
broadcast to the North Caucasus. At the same 
time, the ban in Georgia on Russian TV channels 
imposed following the August 2008 war was 
lifted.
In February, in what he called a gesture towards 
the Russian Federation, President Saakashvili 
lifted the visa requirement for Russian citizens, 
allowing them to stay in Georgia for up to 90 
days, just as Russian citizens living in the North 
Caucasus republics have done since 2010. Russia 
responded in hopeful terms about returning to 
pre-visa days and diplomatic relations. But Tbilisi’s 
old and new governments both made clear that 
there can be no question of restoring formal 
diplomatic relations, which Georgia severed in the 
wake of the August 2008 war, as long as Russia 
maintains a diplomatic presence in the breakaway 
Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Nevertheless, Tbilisi hoped to begin talks on 
restoring trade and cultural ties with the Russian 
Federation even as it continues to seek NATO 
membership and European Union integration.
In September, however, when the NATO Secretary 
General declared, in Tbilisi, that it sees Georgia’s 
future in NATO, Moscow responded by noting 
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that NATO had learned no lessons from the tragic 
events of August 2008, and instead continues to 
encourage Tbilisi.
In March, Russia appointed special representatives 
to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Abkhazia 
appointee is known for his anti-Caucasus stance 
and harsh nationalist positions. The South Ossetia 
representative is at the same time the leader of 
North Ossetia and a proponent of Ossetian unity.
In late August, an incident on the Russian-
Georgian border near Daghestan resulted in 14 
deaths — three Georgian security personnel and 
11 militants, including two Georgians of Chechen 
background. The sole Chechen who survived 
the shootout claims the Saakashvili leadership 
recruited and trained them with the stated aim 
of infiltrating into Russia, then surrounded and 
attacked them to enable Saakashvili to boast on 
the eve of the October parliamentary elections 
that the Georgian army had neutralized a group of 
infiltrators from Daghestan.
The ongoing talks between Azerbaijan and Russia 
on renewing the lease of Azerbaijan’s Gabala over-
the-horizon radar station hit deadlock in January 
after Baku demanded a huge increase in the annual 
rent (from $7 million to $300 million). Gabala is 
officially listed as an ‘information-analysis’ station, 
only because Azerbaijani legislation precludes 
foreign military presence on its territory. Reports 
in mid-September of a provisional agreement that 
would enable Russia to continue to use this de 
facto military facility for a further two or three 
years at the previous rent after the current lease 
agreement expired in early December proved 
wrong, and Russia suspended operations. At the 
same time, the Russian 102nd base, situated in 
Armenia, proposed building a similar station on 
their premises. This would only partially meet 
Russia’s need, since the significance of Gabala is 
not just for its information-gathering capacity, but 
to prevent such capacity being gained by NATO.
Georgia and Azerbaijan reached partial agreement 
during a meeting between their respective 
presidents on the sidelines of the Chicago 
NATO summit in May on the delimitation of 
their border and access for tourists to medieval 
monasteries on Azerbaijani territory. Georgian 
Prime Minister Ivanishvili’s visit to Baku in late 
December yielded agreements to continue the 
border process and on supplies of electricity to 
Georgia from Azerbaijan during the first quarter 
of 2013. The question of Azerbaijani gas supplies 
to Georgia remains problematic in that Azerbaijan 
sells gas to Georgia at a competitive price ($200 
per thousand cubic meters), meaning the leeway 
for a price reduction to Georgian consumers is 
minimal. On the other hand, privately owned gas 
distribution networks (one at least is owned by 
SOCAR’s Georgian subsidiary) can charge their 
own prices (even higher) to consumers. If Baku 
now decides to strongarm Tbilisi by charging 
a higher price and the distribution networks 
increase the price they charge, Ivanishvili will be 
in trouble since one of his important campaign 
pledges was to reduce the price of gas.
Despite its self-ascribed Western orientation, 
Georgia sought to balance between the US and 
Israel, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other; 
it did not formally express support for harsher 
sanctions on Iran.
Relations between Azerbaijan and Iran have been 
tense for two decades. In 2012, they became 
tenser still.
Iran accused Azerbaijan of abetting the 
assassination by Israeli agents of Iranian nuclear 
scientists and of offering logistical support for 
possible Israeli and US air strikes against Iranian 
nuclear facilities. In February, and again in March, 
Azerbaijan’s National Security Ministry claimed to 
have foiled Iranian-orchestrated terrorist plots to 
target the American and Israeli embassies in Baku.
In February, Israel confirmed the sale to 
Azerbaijan of $1.6 billion in weaponry. This meant 
When the NATO Secretary 
General declared that it sees 
Georgia’s future in NATO, 
Moscow responded that NATO 
had learned no lessons from 
August 2008
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Azerbaijan had procured 60 Israeli-produced 
unmanned drones, explaining that they were 
intended to “liberate occupied territories” from 
the Armenians. This did not satisfy Tehran, which 
also accused Azerbaijan of cooperating with 
Israel’s Special Services and giving them free rein 
in Azerbaijan proper and Nakhichevan.  
In May, protestors gathered in front of Iran’s 
embassy in Baku and hurled insults at Iran’s 
religious and lay leadership. This protest took on a 
different significance when soon after, Azerbaijan’s 
leadership turned back the representative of Iran’s 
Supreme Leader, right at the Baku airport.
Tehran immediately recalled its ambassador. Baku 
reciprocated.
In September, three Azerbaijanis were convicted 
and incarcerated on charges of planning to kill 
teachers in a Jewish school. The investigators 
insisted that the convicts were working for the 
Iranian Special Services.
In October, Baku made the same accusation 
against 22 Azerbaijani citizens and imprisoned 
them for planning attacks on the US and Israeli 
embassies in Azerbaijan.
Despite these tensions, Azerbaijan’s only land 
link to its Nakhichevan province is through Iran, 
and that continues to operate. Also in March, the 
trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of Iran, 
Azerbaijan and Turkey took place in Nakhichevan 
(which borders Turkey). The three signed a 
memorandum which included reference to the 
Karabakh conflict, calling for a quick resolution 
based on respect for international borders, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In June, Turkey and Azerbaijan agreed to 
construct TANAP — the Trans Anatolian Gas 
Pipeline — to transport Azerbaijani gas through 
Georgia and Turkey to Europe. This $7 billion 
project will circumvent Russia.
Soon after the gas deal was announced, Baku 
realized that estimates of oil production and oil 
revenues have begun to plummet significantly. 
Azerbaijan’s 2013 state budget will for the first 
time receive more moneys from the oil fund 
than oil revenues expected. This is due in part 
to less oil extraction than was initially expected.
Turkey opened two new consulates in Azerbaijan 
— one in Gyanja, and the other in Lenkoran. 
This makes four representations in Azerbaijan, 
including the embassy in Baku and a consulate 
in Nakhichevan.
Iran lived a very difficult year. New international 
sanctions have come together with louder Israeli 
threats to de-capacitate nuclear plants before they 
achieve the final stage of weapons production. 
These challenges were compounded by the critical 
blows that Iran’s ally, Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad, continued to receive.
Iran underwent another crisis during the year, 
one that is perhaps most threatening to internal 
stability. Over 2012, the Iranian Rial was devalued 
three times on the black market, bringing with 
it unprecedented inflation and ever-deepening 
public dissatisfaction with the authorities. 
According to the International Monetary Fund, 
this was the first time in 20 years, that Iran 
saw economic decline. Oil revenues declined 
by 40 percent, despite high prices on the 
international market. President Ahmadinejad 
blamed all this on international sanctions. This 
complex of problems is sure to have its expression 
in the June 2013 presidential election.
Turkey’s relations with its neighbors were far from 
the zero problems goal it had set for itself. If the 
Kurdish issue ever was just a domestic issue, it 
was so no longer. And Turkey’s changing relations 
with Syria both impacted and were influenced by 
developments in the Syrian Civil War.
Israel confirmed the sale to 
Azerbaijan of $1.6 billion 
in weaponry. Azerbaijan 
had procured 60 Israeli-
produced unmanned drones, 
to “liberate occupied 
territories” from the 
Armenians
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Together with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Turkey 
made no secret of its support for the Syrian 
rebels, to the extent that it secured government 
consent for one year, to conduct military 
activities across the Turkish-Syrian border.
Turkey has experience in cross-border 
incursions. Most recent and notable were Turkish 
attacks into Iraq, on Kurdish rebels. 
But in 2012, the unbelievable happened. Ankara’s 
relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government 
in the north of Iraq are far more neighborly, than 
Ankara’s relations with Baghdad. This is part 
of a complex series of calculations for Turkey. 
On the one hand, it renders Turkey’s domestic 
intolerance of its own Kurdish population even 
more unsustainable. This may be one reason that 
by year’s end, Ankara sought the assistance of 
imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan to 
calm the internal furor over the arrest of dozens 
of political activists, most of them involved in 
the Kurdish struggle.
Another complication for Turkey, in Kurdistan, 
is the growing involvement and interest by 
Israel. Israel is among those neighbors with 
whom Turkey has more than zero problems, 
since relations have continuously deteriorated 
since 2009. In 2012, there was no reconciliation, 
at least publicly, in spite of international calls. 
Even the Syrian crisis, which impacts both 
countries, was insufficient to move Turkey 
off its intransigent vocal anti-Israeli position, 
which makes the Turkish government popular 
domestically and on the Arab Street.
In this environment, the Jewish minority in Turkey 
is also under pressure from the Turkish Special 
Services. Israel, in turn, is furthering relations 
with Turkey’s opponents, including Cyprus.
In June, the Israeli legislature, the Knesset, 
discussed the Armenian Genocide, in an obvious 
move to annoy Turkey.
Despite Turkey’s public pronouncements 
labeling Israel a terrorist state for its actions 
in Gaza in late 2012, Turkish Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoglu also acknowledged that quiet 
negotiations are taking place in Switzerland to 
resolve differences between the two states. When 
NATO declared its intention to place Patriot 
missiles at the Turkey-Syria border in December, 
Turkey indicated that it has agreed to allow Israel 
to participate in non-military NATO activities in 
2013, a departure from previous objections.  
Among the six recognized, unrecognized and 
partly recognized political entities of the 
South Caucasus, only Azerbaijan did not have 
national elections in 2012. In March, Abkhazia 
held parliamentary elections. There were 
presidential elections in South Ossetia in April 
and parliamentary elections in Armenia in May. 
In July, Karabakh held presidential elections and 
Georgia held parliamentary elections in October.
The controversial elections in South Ossetia 
produced a former KGB man as president. In 
Armenia’s controversial election, the ruling 
Republican party gained an absolute majority 
in parliament. In Georgia and in Karabakh, 
the opposition parties registered significant 
gains. In Karabakh, the opposition presidential 
candidate received nearly one-third of the vote. 
In Georgia, the opposition party won a majority 
in Parliament.
THE NAGORNO KARABAKH CONFLICT
Coincidentally, all three Minsk Group co-chair 
countries held presidential elections this year. In 
Russia, Putin re-ascended to the chair. In the US, 
President Barack Obama was re-elected. In France, 
François Hollande replaced Nicolas Sarkozy.
But the distraction of elections and the co-chairs 
can’t be blamed for the fact that since the May 
According to the IMF, this 
was the first time in 20 
years, that Iran saw economic 
decline. Oil revenues declined 
by 40 percent, despite high 
prices on the international 
market
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1994 ceasefire signing, 2012 was probably the 
first year when it can be said there were no 
substantive negotiations.
The deadlock is blamed on a variety of 
circumstances.
Azerbaijan heightened its insistence on Nagorno 
Karabakh’s right to self-determination only within 
the context of Azerbaijan’s own territorial integrity. 
Azerbaijan has begun to publicly reject the first 
principle of the Madrid document — the right 
of the people of Karabakh to self-determination 
through a referendum. At the base of that 
document, which was the last one presented by 
the co-chairs, there is the fundamental concept 
of a referendum (called variously plebiscite or 
expression of will) which gives the conflicting 
sides the opportunity to reconcile the seemingly 
irreconcilable principles of territorial integrity 
and self-determination.
If Azerbaijan rejects that core principle, then 
that document collapses, and it becomes 
unacceptable for Nagorno Karabakh as well. 
Armenian negotiators say, Azerbaijan only pays 
lip service to the three principles at the base 
of the resolution process — self-determination, 
territorial integrity and abstaining from 
the use of force. In reality, Azerbaijan only 
accepts territorial integrity and dismisses the 
right of peoples to self-determination and 
the commitment to a peaceful resolution of 
conflicts, they say.
In the absence of a negotiating process, the 
positions of the sides (the leaderships and the 
publics) regarding future compromises becomes 
even tougher. If years ago, Azerbaijan would at 
least publicly accept the idea of the right of the 
people of Karabakh to a referendum, today Baku 
claims that the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous 
Region is occupied by its own people. In the face of 
such maximalist positions, Armenia and Karabakh, 
too, naturally harden their positions.
The hardening of positions brings, in turn, 
additional tension along the entire Line of Contact 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Nagorno 
Karabakh and Azerbaijan. Tension was paramount 
throughout 2012. The ceasefire was violated daily. 
The Armenian side had nearly a dozen casualties 
from either sniper fire or diversionary incidents. 
The Azerbaijani side, too, registered casualties 
about which Baku rarely makes public statements.
Although there is no official count, experts 
estimate that since the ceasefire of 1994, 
Karabakh and Armenia have lost some 1000 
soldiers, and an unknown number of civilians. 
Azerbaijan claims 3000. Still, Azerbaijan does not 
respond favorably to international calls to pull 
snipers off the Line of Contact.
In 2012, most casualties resulted from incidents 
on the northern part of the Armenia-Azerbaijan 
Line. During the US Secretary of State’s June visit 
alone, the two sides lost nearly a dozen soldiers.
This year, religious leaders also entered the fray. 
After the June killings, the head of the Armenian 
Church condemned the provocative actions of the 
Azerbaijani side and called on the international 
community to rein in Azerbaijan’s militarism. 
The religious head of the Moslem community 
in the Caucasus issued a statement saying, “We 
pray to Allah that we will be able to mount the 
Azerbaijani flag in Karabakh.”
Based on the ever-hardening Azerbaijani 
positions and their consistently belligerent 
public statements, coupled with ever-larger arms 
purchases, it would appear that Baku is viewing 
war as an alternative to peaceful negotiations. As 
Azerbaijan sealed the largest-ever military deal 
with Israel, the Armenian government announced 
that Azerbaijan is readying for war.
In 2012, Azerbaijan’s military budget was $3 
billion — about 8 times the combined defense 
budgets of Armenia and Karabakh, and far more 
Ankara’s relations with 
the Kurdistan Regional 
Government renders Turkey’s 
domestic intolerance of its 
own Kurdish population even 
more unsustainable
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than the combined total state budgets of Armenia 
and Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s own state budget is 
some $22 billion.
International experts insist that a new war 
is possible only once Azerbaijan’s gas and oil 
reserves begin to expire. Until then, they say, it 
won’t risk alienating the foreign companies on its 
soil, nor endanger the actual physical pipelines 
which extend not far from the Karabakh-
Azerbaijan border.  
Only one high-level negotiating meeting took 
place during the year, and that was in January 
in Sochi. Russian President Medvedev and the 
Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents met for 
the tenth time in such a trilateral setting and 
announced that serious progress had been made 
on the basic principles for a resolution.
The European Union offered its support to 
Russia’s mediation, even as it underlined the 
absence of real progress in the process. It called 
on the sides to strive for peace, based on the 
Madrid principles, and expressed hope that its 
representatives would have the opportunity to 
visit Karabakh and adjacent regions without 
preconditions — referring to Azerbaijan’s habit of 
blacklisting those countries whose diplomats enter 
Karabakh through Armenia.
No meetings have taken place since Putin’s 
election. The returned president has made 
no indications that he wishes to continue his 
predecessor’s efforts at trilateral meetings.
But Putin did join with the presidents of the other 
two co-chair countries — the US and France, 
when in Los Cabos, Mexico, during a G20 meeting 
the three issued a statement calling on the sides 
to set aside maximalist positions and avoid enemy 
statements and to reach an agreement based on 
the fundamental principles.
This was the fifth such statement by the co-chair 
country presidents. The first was in Denver in 
1997, the second in Aquilla, Italy, in 2009, the 
third in Muskoka, Canada, in 2010, and the fourth 
in Deauville, France in 2011.
The only other activity during the year was the 
co-Chairs’ periodic visits to the region to meet 
with the leaderships of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as 
well as Karabakh. There were also meetings with 
the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Armenia and Azerbaijan continued to use the 
international press and forums to drive home 
their positions. The unwillingness and inability 
of the Karabakh population to accept Azerbaijani 
rule became very clear when the Azerbaijani 
government managed to secure the return 
of Ramil Safarov, an Azerbaijani soldier, who 
during a NATO training course in Budapest had 
decapitated an Armenian soldier, with an axe. 
It was not just the return of the soldier, who, 
in Hungary had been convicted and given life 
imprisonment. It was the hero’s welcome that he 
received in Azerbaijan which was unequivocally 
rejected by the international community as 
incomprehensible and unacceptable. The nature 
of the discourse around Karabakh and its place 
within Azerbaijan changed. As one Armenian 
pariamentarian put it, Armenians no longer have 
to explain to the world why Karabakh cannot be 
a part of Azerbaijan.
The international community also noted that the 
already-complex negotiating process had now a 
hit a new wall.
In September, in a meeting with the Armenian 
and Azerbaijani foreign ministers, the co-chairs of 
the Minsk Group also issued a statement deploring 
the manner of the Safarov pardon and efforts to 
deify Safarov as very damaging to the peace and 
confidence-building processes.
Even the European Parliament weighed in. The 
US president, too, expressed deep concern and 
Experts estimate that since 
the ceasefire of 1994, 
Karabakh and Armenia 
have lost some 1000 
soldiers, and an unknown 
number of civilians. 
Azerbaijan claims 3000
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demanded an explanation from Hungary, where 
the opposition had turned the extradition issue 
into a cause celebre. The NATO Secretary General 
expressed concern while in Baku, during a joint 
press conference with President Ilham Aliyev. 
Aliyev justified his actions as legal and just, and 
proceeded to award Safarov with military rank, 
back pay and other perks.
Public reaction in Baku was cause for serious 
concern for the peace process and regional peace 
in general. Man-on-the-street interviews justified 
Safarov’s actions, explaining that killing is not 
good, but killing an Armenian is different.
At the same time, the already-tiny Azerbaijani 
community of peace advocates found itself in an 
uncomfortable and untenable situation.
The Safarov affair, coupled with the surprising 
presidential election in Karabakh, where the 
opposition candidate ran a real campaign and 
came away with a respectable 30 percent of the 
vote, will help the international community 
view the possible future relationship of the 
two entities — Karabakh and Azerbaijan — in 
a different light as unequal in their democratic 
credentials. The elections themselves were 
dismissed by international organizations, under 
pressure from Azerbaijan not to appear to be 
legitimizing the status quo. The European Union 
Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton too stated 
that the constitutional and legal framework 
within which the elections were being held 
were not recognized.
However, the statement by the OSCE Minsk Group 
co-chairs differed from past statements. They 
made a point of the fact that none of the three 
co-chair countries recognizes Nagnorno Karabkh 
as a sovereign and independent state. However, 
the Co-Chairs did “acknowledge the need for 
the de facto authorities in Nagorno Karabakh to 
try to organize democratically the public life of 
their population with such a procedure.” On the 
other hand, they also said that the election or 
“the procedures of July 19 in no way prejudge 
the final legal status of Nagorno Karabakh or the 
outcome of the ongoing negotiations to bring a 
lasting and peaceful settlement to the Nagorno 
Karabakh conflict.”
Two American states – Rhode Island and 
Massachusetts – however, did pass resolutions 
recognizing Karabakh, as did the legislature 
of New South Wales in Australia. The foreign 
minister of the South American country of 
Uruguay, in a visit to Yerevan, reinforced the 
right of Karabakh to self-determination. Uruguay’s 
Parliament Head and other parliamentarians 
visited Stepanakert.
Finally, the renovated airport in Karabakh also 
became a subject of contention. Azerbaijan’s 
repeated statements about the use of force against 
aircraft using the airport were met by a response 
from the Minsk Group co-Chairs calling on the 
sides to preclude use of force, and also dismissing 
the airport as a possible leverage to demand a 
change in Karabakh’s status quo.  
Despite what seemed like a year of negative 
choices – not to engage, not to negotiate, not 
to move forward – there was activity among 
international organizations and civil society 
actors. The Safarov pardon created serious 
problems for the peace process, yet under the 
auspices of several British organizations – notably 
Conciliation Resources and International Alert, 
new programs were introduced for confidence 
building purposes. Notably, the European Union 
announced the second phase of the civil society 
program European Partnership for the Peaceful 
Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh, a consortium of five European NGOs. 
They will continue to work with local partners 
in the South Caucasus on peace-building projects 
and attempt to help improve conditions for the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement process.
Together with the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, which is responsible for prisoner 
issues, and the Halo Trust, which does demining 
As one Armenian 
pariamentarian put it, 
Armenians no longer have 
to explain to the world why 
Karabakh cannot be a part 
of Azerbaijan
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work (currently with serious support from the 
US Agency for International Development), there 
are no other international organizations stationed 
in Stepanakert.
ARMENIA — TURKEY
Armenia and Turkey continued to suffer the 
damages of the frozen state of the Armenia-
Turkey protocols. In 2012, official relations 
between the two countries were at a low point. 
Even meetings between mid-level diplomats 
which for two decades regularly took place were 
no longer held. The foreign ministers of the two 
countries did not use multilateral gatherings as 
opportunities for even informal meetings.
Instead, the two sides continued to accuse each 
other. In March, in Germany, the Armenian 
president acknowledged that relations are worse 
than they were before his ‘football diplomacy’ 
began in 2008, and blamed Turkey.
The French Senate’s revisiting the bill to 
criminalize genocide denial further exacerbated 
relations. The French National Assembly had 
approved such a move in late 2011, and the 
Senate debated it in early 2012. The text of 
the legislation did not mention Armenians, yet 
the general assumption and discussion focused 
on the Armenian Genocide, given that there 
is already a law that outlaws Holocaust denial. 
The entire debate came to an end when the 
French Constitutional Court deemed the text 
unconstitutional. But not before it had engulfed 
President Sarkozy, who backed it during his 
election campaign, and the new President 
Hollande, who promised to reintroduce it at a 
later date.
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, too, had become 
embroiled in the debate, calling the measure 
racist, and accusing France of being biased towards 
Armenia, and therefore unfit to be a co-Chair of 
the Minsk Group, mediating the Karabakh conflict.
This was not the only instance where Turkey’s 
and Azerbaijan’s interests were collapsed into the 
same rhetoric.
During 2012, Azerbaijanis living abroad, together 
with expat Turks, organized anti-Armenian 
demonstrations, the largest of which coincided 
with the Azerbaijani commemoration of the 
destruction during the battle over Khojalu 
during the Karabakh war. Posters accompanied 
demonstrations in London, Washington and 
Istanbul. In Istanbul, even the Turkish Interior 
Minister participated, with a nationalistic and 
anti-Armenian speech. Prime Minister Erdogan 
declared that they will not allow the world to 
forget the “genocide of Khojalu.”
Over the course of the year, Ankara continued 
to remain actively engaged in the Karabakh 
issue. In two different official statements, Ankara 
first condemned the presidential election in 
Karabakh (held in July) and accused Armenians of 
“unilaterally trying to legitimize an illegitimate 
status.” In a second statement, Ankara proclaimed 
that the opening of an airport near Stepanakert 
is a provocative act and will damage the 
negotiations. Perhaps Turkey’s economic and 
political advances of recent years are what inform 
such public intervention, and what allow the 
international community’s tolerance of them. The 
tolerance even extends to some clear statements, 
albeit unofficial, that if the Stepanakert airport 
becomes operational, Ankara may extend the land 
blockade to the air and not only suspend air traffic 
between Istanbul and Yerevan, but also close its 
air space to international flights, making travel 
longer and more expensive (as was the case for 
several years in the mid-1990s.)
In August, Turkey adopted legislation which 
makes it impossible for Armenian citizens (as 
well as Syrians, Yemenis, Cubans, Nigerians and 
North Koreans) to acquire land in Turkey. There 
was no effort to dispel the message inherent in 
such an announcement.
Turkey adopted legislation 
which makes it impossible for 
Armenian citizens (as well 
as Syrians, Yemenis, Cubans, 
Nigerians and North Koreans) 
to acquire land in Turkey
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In contrast to these discouraging official 
interactions, Armenia-Turkey programs in the 
civil society sphere have flourished. This is 
both to be welcomed, and to be considered as 
part of a bigger picture. On the one hand, civil 
society organizations and journalists interact and 
exchange visits in various spheres, frequently, 
and with generally positive outcomes, improving 
person-to-person ties, enhancing reciprocal 
knowledge and nurturing understanding. On 
the other hand, according to a 2012 study by 
the Hrant Dink Foundation, there is an increase 
in public statements which preach ethnic and 
religious discrimination and intolerance in the 
Turkish media. The study included some two 
dozen media outlets, and the findings showed 
that the most negative characterizations were of 
Armenians.
Further, another study issued in May by the 
Turkish Economic and Social Science Foundation 
(TESEV) stated that “Armenophobia has been 
rendered a definitive and virtually inseparable 
part of the Turkish identity for long years both 
by the state and the society.”
This can be explained by the persistence of 
acrimonious and intolerant statements at the 
highest levels of Turkish government. Thus, 
useful as the growing number of civil society 
initiatives are, especially after the protocols 
were frozen, they cannot replace the absence of 
normal government-to-government relations, nor 
compensate for acrimony at the very top.
Turkey’s contradictory policy towards its own 
Armenian citizens and Armenian legacy was 
apparent at Akhtamar.
There on the island church, in Van, an Armenian 
religious mass was allowed for the third 
year in a row and many came from Istanbul 
to participate. Yet, today, just as upon its 
renovation three years ago, neither the island, 
nor the church, have any sign or inscription 
bearing the word ‘Armenian.’
On the other hand, for the third year in a row, the 
presidents of Armenia and Turkey congratulated 
each other on their countries’ national days. This 
tradition did not exist before 2010.
Another hopeful development was the third 
annual April 24 commemoration in the heart 
of Istanbul. In Taksim Square, hundreds of 
people, mostly Turks, Kurds and Armenians, 
gathered to commemorate the day that marks the 
beginning of the Armenian Genocide, in 1915. 
Despite a nearby protest demonstration against 
those mourning the mass killings of Armenians, 
attendance at this April 24 event has increased 
each year.
Finally despite the absence of relations, 
Turkey attempted to facilitate the movement 
of Armenians from Syria, through Turkish 
territory, to Armenia. Turkey also allowed an 
airplane carrying aid from Armenia to Syria to 
fly through Turkish airspace. Deeper or more 
sustained assistance, including efforts to secure 
safety for the Armenian minority stuck between 
the regime and the rebels was harder to come 
by, given the absence of open communication 
channels between officials. Armenia’s role was 
thus necessarily limited, or non-existent, vis-à-
vis Turkey and its active role in developments 
in Syria. Without a basic familiarity and comfort 
level between the two countries’ diplomats, 
without open diplomatic channels, Armenia was 
limited in its ability to help protect Armenians’ 
interests in Syria.
Despite multiple unresolved political disputes 
and closed borders, Turkey remains one of the 
major importer countries for Armenia. According 
to official data, the trade turnover between the 
two countries from January to November 2012 
comprised $191.7 million, a 12.4 percent decrease 
over the previous year. The actual bilateral 
trade between Armenia and Turkey is, however, 
assessed at a much higher level: according to 
different estimates it might reach as high as 
$300 million. During the first eleven months 
“Armenophobia has been 
rendered a definitive and 
virtually inseparable part of 
the Turkish identity for long 
years both by the state and 
the society”
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of 2012, according to official statistics, Armenia 
imported $190.9 in Turkish goods, accounting for 
around five percent of total imports to Armenia. 
At the same time Armenian exports to Turkey 
accounted for just $800,000. In 2012, both 
import and export sales dropped over the eleven 
month period, by 12.3 percent and 18.4 percent 
correspondingly. The main channel for commerce 
is Georgia. A portion of goods goes unregistered 
and is transported by shuttle traders.
ARMENIA — GEORGIA
With Turkey and Azerbaijan now Georgia’s main 
trade partners already for a few years, Georgia’s 
foreign policy priorities are inevitably affected. 
The main energy pipelines from the Black Sea 
to international markets pass through Georgia. 
Georgia is the de facto link between the two 
Turkic republics — Turkey and Azerbaijan.
With Turkey, trade has exceeded $1 billion annually, 
with Azerbaijan it is nearing $1 billion.
These relationships have a significant impact 
on Yerevan-Tbilisi relations, as do the depth of 
Armenia-Russia relations and the existence of a 
Russian military base on Armenian soil.
The Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan cooperation will 
result in Armenia’s isolation — intentionally or 
otherwise. Thus, Armenia has no alternative but 
to deepen economic relations with Georgia and 
keep Armenia-Georgia relations at a high level. 
The Georgian Black Sea ports of Batumi and Poti, 
and the Georgian railway are of immeasurable 
importance for Armenia’s economy.
Armenia-Georgia trade remains at a level far 
lower than the two countries’ potential. The 
share of bilateral Armenia-Georgia trade in total 
foreign trade of Armenia stood at only 2.2 percent 
from January to November 2012. At its height 
in 2007, trade had reached $134 million, with 
Armenian exports comprising around 65 percent 
of total bilateral trade. From 2007 to 2009, the 
total turnover between the two countries fell by 
30 percent, at the same time Armenian exports 
to Georgia plummeted by 40 percent. Since 
2009, bilateral trade showed a slow but upward 
trend. In the first 11 months of 2012, the total 
trade turnover between Armenia and Georgia 
reached $115 million, which is still three percent 
less than that of the same period in 2007. From 
January to November 2012, Armenian exports to 
Georgia amounted to $75 million, while imports 
comprised only $40 million.
In recent years, as the Saakashvili administration 
succeeded in fighting corruption, simplifying taxes, 
generally improving the climate for doing business, 
Armenia’s businessmen began to take advantage 
of those opportunities. More than 100 important 
businesses have registered companies in Georgia, 
leading both Armenian and Georgian press to 
describe Armenian business as escaping to Georgia. 
Armenia’s leadership calls it business expansion.
Georgia has neither recognized the Armenian 
Genocide, nor does it debate the recognition issue. 
On April 24, 2012, however, the Genocide issue 
created a storm in the Georgian Parliament when 
an opposition member announced  “Our Armenian 
compatriots are standing outside, demanding that 
we recognize the Genocide.” He reminded his 
colleagues that in 2011 Georgia had recognized the 
genocide of the Circassians and turned that into a 
public relations move. Before the parliamentarian 
finished speaking, another parliamentarian, an 
ethnic Azerbaijani, accosted him and a brawl 
broke out. The Georgian leadership said nothing 
about either the substance of the debate, nor the 
manner in which it was addressed.
In another policy area that is of critical 
importance to Armenia, Georgia has adopted a 
The most important Georgian 
event — regime change 
through elections — did 
become part of public 
discourse in Armenia, at 
least for a short while, and 
temporarily raised some 
hopes of a positive effect on 
democratic processes
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stance to satisfy Azerbaijan. On the occasion of 
Karabakh’s presidential election, held in July, 
Tbilisi posted a statement on the official page of 
the Foreign Ministry declaring that it “does not 
recognize the so-called presidential elections” 
held in Karabakh and fully supports Azerbaijan’s 
territorial integrity and sovereignty. Georgia 
opted for this solution rather than a more neutral 
position on Karabakh, in contrast to Armenia’s 
cautious stance on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
despite the Russian-Armenian alliance.
No joint economic projects were put in place 
during 2012. The construction of the road from 
Yerevan to Batumi through Javakheti is not even 
on the agenda, although five years earlier, Yerevan 
and Tbilisi intended to create a consortium for 
the purpose of building that road which would 
pass through Armenian-populated Javakheti and 
make it possible for Yerevan to reach the Black 
Sea in 5-6 hours.
Georgia implemented economic projects in 
Javakheti and those included road construction. 
Thus, travel time between Akhalkalak and 
Ninotsminda to Tbilisi has been cut by half. In 
addition, the road passes through Tsalka, where 
13 Armenian villages have maintained their 
centuries-old traditions and Western Armenian 
dialect.
Armenian and Georgian media contain fewer 
anti-Armenian or anti-Georgian diatribes. Greater 
people-to-people interaction, largely because of 
Armenians traveling to the Black Sea coast in 
large numbers, is possibly the reason for better 
mutual understanding and the formation of 
positive public opinion in both countries.
Yet, reciprocal perceptions and bilateral relations 
continue to be adversely affected by still-
unresolved matters, including the right to several 
Armenian churches, the preservation of Armenian 
heritage sites. Discrimination in social, legal and 
labor issues continues. However, with the advent 
of the new government, there was talk that 
imprisoned Armenian activists and others would 
receive amnesty.
The year 2012 did not stand out as a great 
year for high-level bilateral visits. The foreign 
ministers each visited once, and the head of the 
Georgian Armed Forces visited Yerevan once. 
Ivanishvili visited Baku before year’s end, with 
promises to visit Yerevan and Ankara, in that 
order, in the new year, in a pattern that has 
become familiar for Georgian leaders.
The most important Georgian event — regime 
change through elections — did become part of 
public discourse in Armenia, at least for a short 
while, and temporarily raised some hopes of a 
positive effect on democratic processes.
ARMENIA — IRAN
Armenia-Iran relations were negatively impacted 
by Iran’s economic difficulties, the devaluation 
of its national currency as well as new stronger 
sanctions by the US and the EU. Several joint 
projects have been frozen indefinitely since Iran 
was to have provided the financial resources.
In 2012, no Armenia-Iran projects got off the 
ground, not even the Armenia-Iran railway which 
the Armenian president had announced four 
years ago.
In October, the 11th session of the Armenian-
Iranian Intergovernmental Commission met in 
Yerevan. During that meeting, Iran’s Energy 
Minister expressed dissatisfaction at the slow 
pace of project implementation. He observed that 
obstacles must be overcome without saying which 
obstacles, or whose obstacles. At the conclusion of 
the session, the two energy ministers announced 
that in the Meghri hydropower plant construction 
groundbreaking would be marked in two weeks 
which led to a groundbreaking ceremony in which 
the President participated. Work has not begun.
Armenia and Iran are 
exploring the establishment 
of a “Peace Park” around 
the Araks river, for which 
Armenia will allocate land 
from the Meghri Arevik 
National Park
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Armenia has begun to import oil products by 
land. Talk of an oil pipeline from Iran to Armenia 
continues, but like other joint energy projects, 
nothing specific has been done. The pipeline is 
to have carried diesel, benzine and airplane fuel 
from Tabriz to Yeraskh.
Construction of the third high voltage electricity 
transmission line which was to have been 
finished in 2011, has not yet begun. Armenia and 
Iran are exploring the establishment of a “Peace 
Park” around the Araks river, for which Armenia 
will allocate land from the Meghri Arevik 
National Park.
Although Armenia-Iran trade is on the increase, 
the numbers are far from satisfactory for 
either side. In 2011, those numbers were $323 
million for Armenia-Iran, and $241 million for 
Armenia-Turkey where borders are closed. In 
the first 11 months of 2012, Armenia-Iran trade 
was $286 million, a 1.8 percent decrease from 
the previous year. At the same time, Armenia-
Turkey trade was $192 million. Moreover, over 
the last five years imports from Iran have 
always been comparable with that from Turkey, 
surpassing it only in 2012. In January to 
November 2012, imports from Iran totaled $199 
million, a modest increase of 2.2 percent. At the 
same time, Armenian exports to Iran dropped 
drastically to $87 million, 10 percent less than 
the previous year.
The number of Iranian tourists to Armenia 
decreased this year, largely due to Iran’s economic 
situation, the devaluation of the Rial and the 
resultant strict limitations on foreign currency 
conversions within Iran. Still, those tourists 
who came had a visible impact on Armenian 
tourist destinations, and in Yerevan’s center. At 
the same time, it became clear that Armenia’s 
tourism infrastructure – in terms of services and 
attitudes, required improvement.
International attention turned to Armenia-Iran 
relations in August when Reuters reported that 
Iran aimed to broaden its banking activity in 
Armenia and attempt to circumvent Western 
sanctions through the Armenian banking system. 
The report claimed that US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton had explored this issue with 
Armenia’s leadership during her June visit. A 
Western diplomat had said that Iran was looking 
to work with AGBA Credit Agricole Bank, although 
15.6 percent of AGBA’s shares belong to the French 
Credit Agricole Bank. The French categorically 
rejected the Iranian claims, calling them 
nonsense.  
Armenia’s Central Bank also refuted the 
allegations immediately, adding that Armenia’s 
banks have no correspondence relationship with 
Iranian banks or financial organizations. The 
Central Bank added that the Iranian Mellat Bank, 
operating in Armenia since 1996, has seen a more 
than 50 percent reduction in its capital since 
2010. The Bank’s customers are small and medium 
businesses with Armenia-Iran trade, tourists and 
students.
In July, President Sargsyan received Iran’s vice-
president. In August, during the Non-Aligned 
Movement Summit, Iranian President Ahmadinejad 
received Armenia’s foreign minister, who also met 
with the president of the Iranian Parliament and 
the foreign minister. Armenia’s foreign minister 
was in Tehran in April as well and held several 
high-level meetings with the president, the 
secretary of the National Security Council and the 
chief arms negotiator, as well as other officials.
During the year the Iranian president’s special 
envoy visited Armenia twice. The Iranian 
interior minister visited Armenia and signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation 
with Armenia’s Police Service.
In 2013, both Armenia (in February) and Iran 
(in June) expect to hold presidential elections. 
Armenia’s Central Bank 
refuted the allegations 
immediately, adding that 
Armenia’s banks have no 
correspondence relationship 
with Iranian banks or 
financial organizations
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Since it is pragmatism and an understanding of 
the minimal needs of the other side that drives 
Armenia-Iran relations, changes in administration 
in either country will have little effect on the 
policies of either.
ARMENIA — RUSSIA
The Russian-Armenian alliance continued to 
come under strain as relations between President 
Sargsyan and Putin remained cool. Putin’s personal 
meeting with former president Robert Kocharian 
early in the year became a subject of speculation, 
until Sargsyan secured his own meeting in August. 
In the fall, Putin’s health problems resulted in 
postponement of his anticipated trip to Armenia 
along with other foreign travel; but President 
Sargsyan and President Putin had an opportunity 
to talk during a CIS summit in December.
A number of developments reflected certain 
unease in Armenian-Russian relations, although 
the generally opaque nature of inter-state ties left 
much room to guesswork.
Russia continued major military sales to 
Azerbaijan, delivering dozens of upgraded attack 
and transport helicopters to a country that 
continued to threaten a war with its ally; there 
was also talk of sales of new Russian tanks to 
Azerbaijan. At the same time, as part of its 
‘balancing’ approach, Russia reportedly delivered 
an undisclosed number of attack helicopters to 
Armenia.
In September, Armenian and Russian forces, 
joined by forces from fellow Collective Security 
Treaty Organization members Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, held major military exercises in 
Armenia. Russia also conducts joint exercises with 
Azerbaijani border guards and naval forces.  
This balancing could also be seen in official 
visits. Russia’s foreign minister and leaders 
of the Russian parliament’s upper and lower 
chambers made back-to-back visits to Armenia 
and Azerbaijan. In July, the Duma leadership 
reportedly blocked members from monitoring 
the presidential elections in Nagorno Karabakh. 
Earlier, judging by its official statement, Russia 
appeared less concerned than the US about 
the scandal surrounding the return and pardon 
of the axe murderer Ramil Safarov, as well as 
Azerbaijan’s loud threats to shoot down civilian 
aircraft flying to Stepanakert.
Armenia continued to perform its own foreign 
policy balancing act between Russia and the West. 
On Syria, the most pressing international crisis 
of the year, the Armenian government did not 
align with Russia’s support for the Assad regime, 
nor did it join in calls to bring it down, trying to 
maintain a neutrality that would be beneficial to 
the Syrian Armenian community.
Most significantly, Armenia remains ambivalent 
about Putin’s proposed Eurasian Union. Armenia 
continues its negotiations with the European 
Union on the Association and Free Trade 
agreements. This ambivalence will become 
increasingly difficult to maintain since both the 
EU and Russia will increase pressure on Armenia 
to make a choice.
Armenia and Russia also openly disagreed about 
the Russian state program promoting immigration 
to Russia from former Soviet republics. Armenians 
held public protests against the Russian 
government’s policy.  
The Russian government appeared to have 
increased the price for natural gas sold to 
Armenia from $180 to between $220-244 per 
thousand cubic meters. This price rise was 
reflected in official customs and tax reports, 
even as the Armenian government continued 
to claim at year’s end that price talks were not 
concluded.
The Armenian government 
did not align with Russia’s 
support for the Assad 
regime, nor did it join in 
calls to bring it down, trying 
to maintain a neutrality that 
would be beneficial to the 
Syrian Armenian community
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One of Armenia’s strategic priorities, the 
construction of a new nuclear power plant, has 
interested only Russia, which has promised up to 
a 50 percent participation in a project estimated 
to cost between five and seven billion dollars.
Although the new plant was to be commissioned 
in 2016, the expected date of the old plant’s de-
commissioning, it is clear this deadline will not 
be met.
There was an 80 percent decline in direct Russian 
investments in Armenia in the first six months 
of the year, but bilateral trade was on track to 
surpass the $1 billion level of recent years. In 
the January to November 2012 period, the total 
Armenia-Russia trade amounted to $1.2 billion, 
showing an increase of 22 percent, compared to 
the same period in 2011. With nearly $1 billion 
imports from Russia in the first 11 months alone, 
the trade balance is heavily in favor of Russia. 
Armenian exports to Russia have also increased in 
the 11 months of 2012 and reached $254 million, 
a 30 percent increase over the previous year.
ARMENIA — EU
In February, the European Commission agreed 
to commence talks with Armenia on a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. The talks 
officially began in June, with 14 working groups 
negotiating the agreement’s 15 chapters.
Countries of the European Union continued to 
account for the largest share of Armenia’s foreign 
trade, amounting to $1.8 billion in 2011. In 2012, 
the total trade turnover has declined, amounting 
to $1.5 billion, a decrease of six percent over 
2011. With nearly 40 percent of total Armenian 
exports, the EU remains the largest export 
market for Armenia. In January to November 
2012, Armenian exports to the EU reached 
$512 million, an eight percent decrease from 
the previous year. At the same time, Armenian 
imports from the EU totaled $1 billion, a decrease 
of 4.9 percent. 
In December, Armenia and the EU signed a visa 
facilitation agreement thus clearing the path 
for more exchanges and visits especially by 
businessmen and educators, as well as students.
Hungary’s extradition of the Azerbaijani national 
who brutally murdered a fellow Armenian 
student at the NATO English language course 
in 2004 caused the first major crisis between 
Armenia and an EU member state. Armenia broke 
off diplomatic ties with Hungary, just as the EU 
declined to openly criticize its member state. 
The European Parliament passed a resolution 
criticizing Azerbaijan.
Months before that crisis, Prime Minister 
Tigran Sargsyan openly urged the EU to 
threaten sanctions against Azerbaijan after it 
initiated the latest round of deadly skirmishes 
on the border with Armenia in June. But EU’s 
energy security considerations, which factor 
in future natural gas supplies from Azerbaijan, 
appeared to continue to trump concerns over 
security in the Caucasus.
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
offered only lukewarm criticism of Azerbaijan, as 
he made a pre-planned trip to Yerevan and Baku 
only days after the convicted axe-murderer was 
freed and promoted.
Armenia remained actively engaged with NATO’s 
mission in Afghanistan, where an Armenian 
peacekeeping company continued to serve under 
German command, there were also various 
activities under the NATO Individual Partnership 
Action Plan.
President Sargsyan visited Brussels for talks with 
senior EU and NATO leaders in March and again in 
June. Sargsyan also visited with the newly-elected 
French President François Hollande in November. 
Hollande had received Azerbaijan’s leader in 
September amid protests from French Armenians, 
in the wake of the Safarov pardon.
The EU postponed a donors’ 
conference saying such 
a conference would be 
conditioned by the processes 
of the upcoming presidential 
elections
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A delegation of French Senators went to both 
Yerevan and Stepanakert in May and three 
members of the European Parliament observed the 
Nagorno Karabakh presidential elections in July.
In late September, EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement Stefan Füle visited Armenia to 
encourage reform efforts and to “appreciate 
Armenia’s active engagement within the Eastern 
Partnership.” At the conclusion of the visit, 
he expressed dissatisfaction with processes 
going slowly. The EU later postponed a donors 
conference for Armenia to have been held 
after the parliamentary elections, saying such a 
conference would be conditioned by the processes 
of the upcoming presidential elections. 
In November, European Commission President 
José Manuel Barroso came to Yerevan to 
participate in a European People’s Party event on 
the Eastern Partnership. Three European foreign 
ministers — from Sweden, Bulgaria and Poland 
— followed soon after on a three-country tour of 
the Caucasus.
ARMENIA — US
The Sargsyan administration continued to 
benefit from US goodwill inherited from the 
period of Armenia-Turkey talks. Relations 
remained generally positive but mostly aimless 
throughout 2012.
In May, the United States gave a positive 
assessment to the parliamentary elections 
that saw President Sargsyan’s party win an 
outright majority.  But the US also criticized the 
Armenian government for a seemingly politically 
motivated harassment of former foreign minister 
Vartan Oskanian, and the Civilitas Foundation, 
which he founded.
The White House and the State Department 
issued strong-worded messages that condemned 
Azerbaijan for releasing and promoting an axe 
murderer extradited from Hungary, although as 
of year’s end, the scandal had made no apparent 
impact on any policy, since even Armenia had 
resumed talks with Azerbaijan. There was no 
tangible American effort to promote a change in 
Turkey’s policy towards Armenia and the Obama 
Administration continued to come under fire for 
avoiding use of the term ‘genocide’ although the 
presidential statement on April 24, 2012, was 
one of the strongest ever.
Early in the year, the US government approved 
financing for the sale of satellite technology 
to Azerbaijan that could have military 
communications uses. In June, another sale – of 
helicopter-based surveillance equipment – was 
blocked after a senior Congressman raised 
objections. No public objections were raised to 
Israeli weapons sales to Azerbaijan, even though 
some of the systems sold are based on US 
technologies.
The US-championed sanctions against Iran 
continued to have a negative impact on 
Armenia. In August, President Sargsyan dropped 
out of the Non-Aligned Summit held in Tehran 
and Iranian-Armenian economic projects were 
being delayed.  
The US aid level to Armenia was expected to 
remain unchanged at about $40 million; the 
House of Representatives proposed $5 million 
in aid to Nagorno Karabakh to also include 
development aid. There were some calls for the 
US to help Armenia absorb refugees from Syria, 
but no allocations were made as of year’s end.
Bilateral trade turnover amounted to about 
$248 million in 2011, a 28 percent increase 
over 2010. In the first 11 months of 2012, trade 
stood at $210 million, with over $55 million 
negative trade balance for Armenia. In the 
same period, Armenian imports from the US 
reached $133 million, a decrease of 2.8 percent. 
In the same 11 month period, Armenian 
exports to the US dropped by 16 percent and 
reached around $77 million. Overall, Armenia 
— US trade accounts for only four percent of 
Armenia’s total external trade. 
There was no tangible 
American effort to promote 
a change in Turkey’s policy 
towards Armenia
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Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State 
Clinton were the most senior US interlocutors 
for Armenia.
In February, Secretary Clinton met with 
Armenia’s foreign minister at the Munich 
Security Conference and in June, she paid a 
second visit to the three Caucasus republics. The 
US-Armenia Joint Economic task force met in 
Yerevan in October to discuss the standard range 
of issues from US aid to intellectual property to 
nuclear energy safety.
Prime Minister Sargsyan came to the US in 
December, visiting the Silicon valley and top 
universities in California and Massachusetts; he 
was also received by Vice President Biden at the 
White House to “discuss political and economic 
reforms” in Armenia.
In May, Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian led 
the delegation to the NATO Summit in Chicago, 
when President Sargsyan dropped out for the 
second year in a row after the alliance refused 
to change its summit language that privileged 
territorial integrity in the former Soviet space.
There was a brisk tempo of military exchanges. 
In March, Defense Minister Seyran Ohanian 
held talks with his counterpart in Washington; 
Ohanian returned to U.S. in May to attend the 
NATO Summit.
In April, Armenian forces held first-ever bilateral 
exercises with Romania-based US Marines, ahead 
of Armenian peacekeepers’ first-ever deployment 
under direct US command in Kosovo in July. 
Visitors to Armenia included the Secretary of the 
Navy (as overseer of the Marine force in Romania) 
and senior US European Command officers.
One Senate and two House delegations came to 
Armenia this year.
Obama’s re-election — together with the 
electoral outcome in Georgia — appeared to 
mean that the US may remain content with 
letting Russia continue to play a more prominent 
regional role; but outgoing Secretary of State 
Clinton surprised many as she revealed that the 
United States was “trying to figure out effective 
ways to slow down or prevent” the establishment 
of the Eurasian Union championed by Putin.
OUTLOOK
2013 will see elections in the three recognized 
republics of the South Caucasus as well as in Iran. In 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, surprises are unlikely and 
both presidents will most likely continue in office.
Since 2013 is an election year, Azerbaijani 
military rhetoric will be heightened. These will 
be combined with special efforts in international 
and bilateral relations, attempting to neutralize 
the principle of self-determination in the 
negotiating documents, and to weaken the 
international perception of its being the key 
attribute in the negotiating process.
For Georgia, the October presidential election 
will be yet another test of democracy. If Bidzina 
Ivanishvili and his government are able to 
organize a free, fair and competitive election, 
like the parliamentary elections held in 2012, 
then Georgia will be clearly differentiated from 
its immediate neighbors. 
Iran’s presidential election will be conducted 
in a more complex international and domestic 
environment. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad cannot 
run for another term. Thus, in June, the Islamic 
Republic will have a new president. Although the 
last word belongs to the Religious Leader, the 
person, style and rhetoric of the president can 
impact Iran’s relations with its neighbors. 
Additional sanctions on Iran will make Iran-
Azerbaijan tensions worse. Iran is convinced 
and concerned that of all its neighbors, it is 
Azerbaijan that is prepared to become a front for 
the West and Israel if the nuclear issue were to 
be resolved militarily.
There may be improvement in Russia-Georgia 
relations and that can only have a positive 
impact on both Southern and Northern 
Caucasus, especially Armenia.
There are no expectations for progress in 
Armenia-Turkey relations and in the settlement of 
23
CIVILITAS FOUNDATIONARMENIA 2012
A REGION MOVING APART
the Karabakh conflict. Ankara continues to link 
improved relations with Armenia to a change in 
the status quo in the Karabakh conflict. Such a 
change is very unlikely.
Azerbaijan and Turkey will work more 
persistently and in tandem against predictable 
Armenian issues, such as Karabakh and 
Genocide denial.  They will also attempt to 
mischaracterize Armenia-Iran friendly relations 
as an obstacle to the West’s efforts to contain 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
POLICY OPITONS
Armenia’s foreign policy priorities must be better 
articulated. This year, Armenia must make a choice 
between European integration and the Eurasian 
Union. If Armenia has no choice but to join the 
Eurasian Union, that must be honestly presented 
to the Armenian public and publicly addressed. 
The uncertainty will adversely affect relations with 
both the European Union and Russia.
Given the two closed borders to the east 
and west, and the UN sanctions against Iran, 
Armenia’s only full-fledged open border is the 
one with Georgia. In order to maximally utilize 
those links, Armenia-Georgia relations must be 
taken to a new level entirely by promoting flights 
between the capitals and a much more easily 
passable border. These must be part of a larger 
program leading to deeper integration between 
the two countries at all levels. 
Regardless of what changes are introduced in 
Georgia-Russia relations, Armenia must not 
only maintain but also deepen good neighborly 
relations with Georgia. No change of government 
in Georgia should shake the primacy of Armenia-
Georgia relations.
With Iran, Armenia must maintain normal 
relations and not become entangled in tougher 
military and economic sanctions.
Armenia must maintain its position of positive 
neutrality in the Syria conflict, always keeping 
in mind the physical security of the Armenian 
community of Syria.
Armenia can and must withdraw from the 
Armenia-Turkey protocols. The protraction of this 
frozen situation does not serve Armenia’s interests. 
The final removal of the protocols will allow the 
introduction of new instruments to re-address this 
critical relationship.
In the NK resolution process, Armenians must 
focus not on endless responses to  Azerbaijani 
charges and provocations, rather on assuring 
that the international community does not 
deviate from the fundamental principle of self-
determination that is and should remain central to 
the resolution.
Armenia must demonstrate support for Armenian-
Azerbaijani exchange programs for academics, 
journalists and artists as a form of public 
diplomacy, and not only in third countries, but 
also in Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh.
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The year began with claims 
by both the Republicans 
and the Prosperous Armenia 
Party that the people would 
choose them as the winners 
of the May 2012 parliamentary 
election. The year ended with 
the Republicans having won a 
majority in Parliament, and, as a 
consequence of various choices 
by political parties, assured a 
presidential election victory in 
early 2013.
Among the political establishment, the year saw 
some debate on policy choices as well. But the bulk 
of the political discourse in 2012 centered around 
the role each party would adopt before, during and 
after the parliamentary election, and therefore, in 
the presidential election to come in 2013.
Debate about other choices — social inequalities, 
judicial transparency, economic monopolies 
— sometimes, but not always, concluded with 
expectations of elections. Debate about ways to 
eliminate the existing economic controls, for 
example, began early in the year, and opposition 
voices stressed that elections are the only 
path toward regime change and removing the 
monopolies. On the other hand, environmental 
and social protests intentionally stayed away from 
discussions about elections and parties.
The 2012 political environment was new and 
different in that it appeared as if most of the 
political forces, whether in or out of parliament, 
seemed to recognize the value of combining 
resources and presenting a united front. Early 
in the year, opposition forces joined together to 
change the way parliament members are elected. 
They wanted to do away with the current split 
system where 41 are elected when they receive 
a majority of votes in geographical districts 
(majoritarian members), and 90 are elected from 
a list of names put forward by a political party 
(party slate members). They argued that a system 
that is completely party-based would make for a 
fairer playing field.
They created what some opposition members 
called an “unprecedented collaboration.”  This was 
the first time that the Prosperous Armenia Party, 
a member still of the Ruling Coalition, diverted 
from the ruling Republican Party’s position and 
came out in agreement with the idea. 
The year continued with “unprecedented 
collaboration.” Already in January, there was talk 
that the 10-year-old Heritage Party, headed by 
former foreign minister Raffi Hovannisian, already 
with six seats in Parliament, and the newly-
formed Free Democrats, formed soon after former 
foreign minister Alexander Arzumanian left the 
Armenian National Movement, with which he’d 
been associated for nearly two decades, would 
form a joint slate.
Also in January, the Prosperous Armenia 
Party, the Heritage Party and the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation–Dashnaktsutyun joined 
together in Parliament to request a hearing on 
the benefits of a party only system versus the 
existing split system. The three parties argued 
that this is a way to limit or do away with the 
large number of big-name, strong businessmen 
who are easily elected in geographic districts, 
against less powerful competitors without equal 
economic and social leverage.
A few weeks later, perhaps in response, the Prime 
Minister who had only joined the Republican 
Party while in office, announced that Republicans 
would have no big name businessmen on 
the party slate. The next day businessmen-
parliamentarians were quick to confirm they will 
run nevertheless. Nonetheless, hearings were held, 
and when the bill came to a vote, in February, it 
did not pass. The system remained the same with 
a vote of 41 in favor and 70 opposed.
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This was the first major vote in which the 
Prosperous Armenia Party demonstrably did not 
side with the ruling party. Either coincidentally, 
or as a consequence of slightly breaking rank, 
Prosperous Armenia leader Gagik Tsarukyan, 
himself a wealthy businessman and philanthropist, 
saw his personal and business associates come 
under administrative pressure as early as January.
In February, former foreign minister Vartan 
Oskanian joined the Prosperous Armenia Party. 
Oskanian, who had been in government for 17 
years, but had had no prior party affiliation, 
explained that he believed that the Prosperous 
Armenia Party, with its size and resources, could 
prove to be a viable alternative to the Republican 
party. Observers said the Prosperous Party had 
made a choice — to acquire a new profile, and 
political clout.
Despite their loss in that all-important vote, the 
collaboration continued.  In March, Levon Ter-
Petrossian, first president of Armenia and the 
head of the Armenian National Congress, which 
claimed the ‘opposition’ title for itself, referred 
to cooperation. Levon Zurabyan, Congress 
Coordinator, explained that the “regime must be 
isolated.” He insisted that Armenia is heading 
towards a calamitous situation and a broad 
political front is essential in order to rapidly 
address the need to form a legitimate government 
through free and fair elections.  
In February, the Armenian Statistical Service 
announced the results of the 2011 census. In 
the previous census conducted in 2001, the 
population was 3.5 million, of whom three million 
were in country. According to the 2011 census, 
the number of people in country was 2,870,000, 
dropping by 130,000. 
The emigration debate intensified, and with it 
political accusations about a declining economy 
and disappearing hope. Public officials, including 
the head of the Migration Office, minimized 
the impact of the decrease, saying these are 
normal fluctuations. Others responded saying 
that a declining birth rate, no in-migration, and 
demonstrable out-migration will necessarily lead 
to a decline in population. Emigration remained 
the topic of the year.
The ethics of politicians and government workers 
became a controversial topic twice during the 
year. In January, President Sargsyan created a 
high-level Ethics Commission, and appointed 
individuals proposed by the three branches of 
government. Many in the media and in and out 
of opposition dismissed the move, saying those 
who were appointed were mandated to investigate 
corruption issues, conflict of interest issues and 
other ethical violations by members of those same 
three branches of government.
Later in the year, the new Parliament spent most 
of one day in December in a brawl over who 
should make up the majority of the Parliament’s 
Ethics Commission. Parliamentary regulations give 
the Ethics Committee majority to the opposition, 
with two seats reserved for the ruling party. 
The Republicans had set about to change this 
by adding two seats to the committee for their 
own members, thus making the two sides equal. 
Debate disintegrated into a shouting match on the 
day the changes were suggested. On the following 
day, the parliament’s leadership backed away from 
the proposed changes.
These debates echoed what, in February, the OSCE 
election observation mission had called ‘extreme 
distrust between government and opposition.’ That 
distrust was manifested in months to come as 
each party proclaimed it would recruit hundreds 
(or thousands even) of volunteers to monitor the 
goings-on in the 2000 precincts.
But fundamentally, all other issues aside, for 
Armenia, 2012 was a year of electoral choices -- 
The 2012 political 
environment was new and 
different in that it appeared 
as if most of the political 
forces, whether in or out 
of parliament, seemed to 
recognize the value of 
combining resources and 
presenting a united front.
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Parliamentary elections in May, and preparation 
for presidential elections the following year.
ELECTIONS
It was an electoral year for most of Armenia’s 
towns and villages as well. In most of the 
hundreds of local government elections, there was 
often only one candidate. The Republican Party 
won the overwhelming majority of seats. One 
exception was the election in Gyumri, for mayor. 
There, a top member of the Prosperous Armenia 
Party won, with support from President Sargsyan.
In 2005, Armenia had passed constitutional 
amendments, based on which it moved from a 
presidential to a semi-presidential system by 
enhancing the role of the parliamentary majority.
For the ruling party then, the 2012 election 
threatened to take away their political monopoly. 
Over the previous five years, the president had 
enjoyed control over the prime minister and the 
ministries, as well as the judicial branch, given 
his party’s strong standing in Parliament and a 
coalition with two other parties — the Prosperous 
Armenia Party and the Rule of Law Party — to 
cement that hold.
The ruling Republican Party’s fear was that the 
2012 parliamentary election might be the testing 
ground for the constitutional changes and their 
impact on the nature and form of Armenian 
government.
Each side wanted to win and to claim legitimacy. 
This emerged as the primary election campaign 
issue and eclipsed the serious political, 
economic, social and foreign policy problems the 
country faces.
On the other hand, the focus on the election 
could also be explained by the urgency of the 
problems themselves. For those who saw a 
hopeful electoral environment, a transparent 
electoral process was the way to achieve more 
legitimate representation in a Parliament that 
would have to become a truly independent and 
functioning legislature if it were to seriously 
tackle acute social and economic challenges.
This attempt to actually create a functioning 
legislature, with internal checks and balances, 
was made in a political environment with new 
alignments. The Republican Party no longer 
seemed the inevitable, monolithic political power. 
In the weeks and months prior to the election, 
the Prosperous Armenia Party sounded more and 
more like an independent political force, rather 
than a loyal coalition partner with popularity in 
the regions, which is what it had been for much 
of the last five years.
Despite widespread initial incredulity among 
voters and observers, the Prosperous Armenia 
Party called itself an alternative and said it was 
serious about its intentions to secure first place. 
The party, identified largely with its founder, 
Tsarukyan, even brought in new faces, among 
them Oskanian, whose task it appeared was to 
give the party greater political credentials.
The Armenian National Congress (ANC) presented 
itself as a serious contender ready to come in 
from the street and become a force for change in 
the National Assembly.
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation-
Dashnaktsutyun and the Heritage Party both 
had expectations as well. Heritage was perceived 
as the reliable alternative voice and the 
Dashnaktsutyun remained the only political party 
with an ideology, a program, a platform and not 
identified with solely one political figure.
The unprecedented configuration of serious 
forces raised hopes that even a slightly more fair 
election could produce a much more balanced 
National Assembly with natural checks and 
Armenia is heading towards 
a calamitous situation and 
a broad political front is 
essential in order to rapidly 
address the need to form 
a legitimate government 
through free and fair 
elections.
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balances built in, with real coalitions, without 
the ruling party enjoying absolute control over 
all branches of government as had been the case 
since independence.
The collaborative spirit of the pre-campaign 
period extended into the campaign. The driving 
force was a clear conflation of interests — fair 
elections where each believed it would receive 
a respectable proportion of seats. The ANC and 
the Dashnaktsutyun joined in a historic-first 
collaboration. The cooperation between the ANC and 
the Prosperous Armenia Party, too, was unexpected 
and precedent-setting. After all, it was the 
leadership of the ANC who, in 1994, declared the 
Dashnaktsutyun an illegal presence in Armenia, and 
jailed several of its leaders. As for the Prosperous 
Armenia Party which was formed during Robert 
Kocharian’s presidency and with, at the very least, 
his blessing, the ANC-Prosperous cooperation meant 
setting aside, even if temporarily, the Ter-Petrossian 
and Kocharian acrimony.
With this in mind, in early April, the Prosperous 
Armenia Party, the extra-parliamentary 
Armenian National Congress, and the Armenian 
Revolutionary federation-Dashnaktsutyun set up a 
Joint Oversight Body with the stated intention of 
minimizing electoral fraud and publicizing those 
violations wherever they occurred.
This joint body — and in fact the entire 
situation with new configurations and increased 
expectations — was disparaged by those who 
insisted that given the auxiliary role played by the 
parliament in Armenian politics, that ballot would 
be not so important in and of itself. Some feared 
that the true purpose of the Prosperous Armenia 
Party was to pretend to be an ‘alternative’ simply 
to woo votes away from the ANC. 
Others believed that a win by the Republican 
Party was inevitable and it would continue to 
dominate the legislature.
Nevertheless, eight parties and one bloc 
campaigned, largely without restrictions. The 
broadcast media, which are largely owned by, 
aligned with or dependent on one or another of 
the parties, provided extensive coverage that did 
not violate the law.
The eight parties were the Republican Party, 
Prosperous Armenia, Rule of Law, the Armenian 
Revolutionary federation-Dashnaktsutyun, and 
Heritage, all of which were represented in the 
parliament which served from 2007 to 2012, as 
well as the Communist Party of Armenia, the 
Democratic Party of Armenia and the obscure 
United Armenians Party.
The Republican Party entered the election 
with the widely-held assumption that as the 
ruling party it would retain its domination of the 
legislature. The Republicans had 63 of the total 131 
seats in the outgoing parliament. In fact, the May 
2012 ballot was also seen as a way of clarifying 
which political figure(s) stood the best chance of 
winning the presidential ballot in February 2013, 
in which President Serzh Sargsyan would certainly 
seek a second term. The president remained 
closely identified with his party, frequently 
wearing the party pin on his lapel.
For the Republican Party, international 
acknowledgement that the vote was free and fair 
was crucial to dispel any lingering suspicions 
about the fairness of the 2008 presidential ballot 
and thus undercut the persistent charges by Ter-
Petrossian and his ANC that the current leadership 
lacks legitimacy. It was also seen as important on 
the eve of the anticipated free trade talks with the 
European Union. Both the US and the EU affirmed 
their interest in ensuring the Armenian authorities 
delivered on their promise that the election would 
indeed be free, fair and transparent.
President Sargsyan himself took the lead in 
assuring the population of his determination 
to demolish what he termed the “mistaken 
perception” that successive elections in Armenia 
are routinely rigged.
President Sargsyan topped the Republican 
Party list — an extraordinary step for politics 
in mature democracies and the first time 
For the ruling party then, 
the 2012 election threatened 
to take away their political 
monopoly
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an incumbent president has ever done so in 
Armenia. Then followed the current parliament 
speaker and the prime minister.
Less than 10 percent of the Republican Party slate 
was from the business community. Nevertheless, 
another 30-plus businessmen candidates, either 
party members or otherwise close to the ruling 
party, ran in the single-mandate constituencies. 
The president actively campaigned for them.
The Prosperous Armenia Party, which was 
founded in 2004 by businessman Tsarukyan, 
had polled second in the 2007 parliamentary 
election with 25 seats, compared with 63 for the 
Republicans, and accepted the latter’s offer to 
join the new coalition government. But beginning 
in 2010, it had sought to create a new image as 
a genuine and potentially influential political 
player. In February, Prosperous joined the other 
coalition parties to publicly state they would each 
participate independently in the May election, 
by fielding separate lists of candidates for the 90 
seats allocated under the proportional system.
First on the Prosperous Party list was Tsarukyan, 
followed by Oskanian, whose public statements on 
various issues — from foreign policy to economic 
policy — were perceived as oppositional to the 
government’s positions. All told, including the 
party chairman, Prosperous Armenia’s list of 
candidates included 40 businessmen.
This was the Armenian National Congress’s 
first run for parliamentary seats. The Armenian 
National Movement, the forerunner of the ANC, 
registered separately to participate in the 2007 
election under the proportional system but 
withdrew weeks before the vote, declaring its 
regret that the various opposition forces failed to 
close ranks in light of the anticipated falsification 
of the outcome.
The Armenian National Movement is in effect the 
core of the ANC, which coalesced in the summer 
of 2008 as a political alliance of some 20 parties 
that had backed Ter-Petrossian’s candidacy in the 
February presidential election. Ten of them were 
represented on the Congress’s list, two headed by 
two former prime ministers.  There were other 
veteran political figures on the list, many from 
the Ter-Petrossian administrations and some who 
had made a name for themselves during the four 
years of street politics in which the ANC had 
engaged since the 2008 presidential election.
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation-
Dashnaktsutyun list numbered 85 names, 
starting with leading party members who 
were in the outgoing parliament and including 
businessmen with and without party affiliation. 
Absent from the list were several prominent 
deputies from the previous parliament. The 
allocation of top slots in the list went to non-
party members over prominent and recognizable 
party loyalists and ideologues.
The Heritage Party proportional list was 
headed by the party’s founder and leader, 
Raffi Hovannisian, who served under Ter-
Petrossian as foreign minister immediately after 
independence. He was closely followed by the 
leaders of the newly-formed Free Democrats, 
many of whom had earlier in the year left the 
Armenian National Congress. Arzumanyan, 
who had headed Ter-Petrossian’s presidential 
campaign in 2008, was thus number four on the 
heritage list.
The Rule of Law Party’s list of candidates 
numbered 178 names headed by its leader Arthur 
Baghdasaryan.  The other three parties that 
fielded party lists were the Communist Party of 
Armenia (75 candidates), the Democratic Party 
of Armenia (45 candidates), and the United 
Armenians Party (29 candidates.)
None of the parties in the campaign ran as 
incumbents or on their track record. All 
presented themselves as agents of change.
This was even true of the ruling Republican 
Party. Although President Sargsyan did enumerate 
accomplishments and successes of the past 
Heritage was perceived as 
the reliable alternative voice 
and the Dashnaktsutyun 
remained the only political 
party with an ideology
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five years, he spoke more of the need for 
improvement. For a ruling party to campaign 
on change meant an acknowledgment of the 
great popular distrust and dissatisfaction. Rivals 
responded that for real change then, there would 
need to be a change at the top.
With the ability to benefit from the availability 
of resources, both administrative and financial, 
Republican Party rallies were notable for the 
overwhelming participation of government 
employees, with special reliance on the education 
sector. The media, local observers and international 
observers remarked on the conspicuous presence 
of students and teachers at their rallies.
The highly visible role played during the election 
campaign by President Sargsyan on behalf of the 
Republican Party, of which he is chairman, was 
unprecedented. Sargsyan’s involvement created 
the twin impressions that the party’s top leaders 
decided collectively to take a back seat and let 
Sargsyan campaign virtually single-handedly on 
the party’s behalf, and that Sargsyan was treating 
the election campaign as the first round of the 
presidential ballot due in February 2013 in which 
he intends to seek reelection.
The Prosperous Armenia Party was personified 
by Tsarukyan, whose immense wealth combined 
with charitable activity had turned him into a 
celebrity. While Tsarukyan spoke in basic terms 
about creating a dignified future and helping 
the country to flourish, Oskanian criticized 
the president’s foreign policy and, most of all, 
the government’s economic policy. None of the 
Prosperous candidates criticized the Armenian 
National Congress or the Dashnaktsutyun.
The Armenian National Congress campaign 
seemed to be the natural continuation of the 
four-year-long series of public rallies and 
meetings that the public associated with the ANC. 
The public demonstrations continued to feature 
economic and political criticism. Attendance 
at ANC campaign meetings, especially outside 
Yerevan, was sparse, however.  
Throughout the campaign, Heritage Party 
founder and chairman Raffi Hovannisian 
remained the face of the party. Heritage 
criticized the situation in Armenia, in harsh, 
scornful terms, without direct criticism of the 
ruling Republican Party. Instead they engaged in 
aggressive criticism of Prosperous Armenia and 
the Armenian National Congress. Turnout at the 
Heritage Party’s pre-election meetings was not 
remarkable.
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation had 
drafted an impressive alternative economic 
strategy and stressed throughout the campaign 
that the economic policies of the current 
ruling party have consistently failed to yield 
the intended results. Senior party members 
never passed up an opportunity to criticize the 
Republican Party or the Prime minister.
None of the other three parties staged campaign 
rallies, and together they received 1.5 percent of 
the vote.
The upper limit on election campaign spending 
stipulated in the Electoral Code is 100 million 
AMD (around $242,000) for parties and blocs and 
10 million AMD for candidates running in single-
mandate constituencies. According to official data, 
the Republican Party, the Prosperous Armenia 
Party and the Heritage Party spent nearly that 
limit, the others less.
These funds do not reflect the continued 
distribution of cash and goods which remained a 
part of the campaign process. Whether these were 
‘gifts’ by some and ‘bribes’ by others remained a 
subject of argument.
There were other, more effective and widespread 
violations, including the manipulation of voter 
lists. The Joint Oversight Body attempted to do 
away with the most common manipulation: the 
inclusion of outdated and inaccurate names — 
those who are deceased or who never existed 
— in order to enable votes to be cast in their 
For a ruling party to 
campaign on change meant 
an acknowledgment of the 
great popular distrust and 
dissatisfaction.
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names. They appealed to the Constitutional 
Court to reverse the ruling that prohibits the 
post election publication of the names of those 
who actually voted. The ruling Republican Party 
dismissed the move as a campaign ploy. The 
Constitutional Court rejected the request, calling 
it an invasion of privacy.
There were no major complaints about parties’ 
right to assembly. There were numerous charges 
of abuse of administrative resources were many 
both during the campaign and afterwards, by 
local and international observers.
There were also charges that opinion polls were 
manipulated and became an administrative 
resource. This was the first time that opinion polls 
played a role in Armenia’s electoral politics, if for 
no other reason than simply by their quantity and 
the effort made to legitimize their impact.
Altogether there were seven surveys within four 
weeks, each with 1000+ respondents from around 
the country.
Despite the absence of trust in the way polls are 
implemented, despite a ready dismissal of their 
results, these polls were broadly covered by the 
press and their content made known to a large 
portion of the population.
Except for the very first poll, conducted in March, 
in all polls the Republican Party and President 
Sargsyan were the favorites. The Armenian 
National Congress never passed the six percent 
mark, and the other parties hovered around those 
same numbers. 
One of the polling agencies bearing the name 
Gallup, but with no affiliation with the reputable 
Gallup, Inc. conducted the first-ever exit polls on 
election days. Carried out in 131 unnamed polling 
stations across the country, they produced results 
which were nearly identical to the final outcome, 
despite a non-response rate of nearly 50 percent. 
That poll was labeled either suspicious or surprising 
or expected, depending on one’s political take.
The broadcast media readily cited these polls, in 
line with their consistently controlled, uncritical 
approach. This fed what the OSCE / ODIHR election 
monitoring mission described as “the general lack of 
confidence among political parties and the general 
public in the integrity of the election process.”
Media coverage of the 28-day election campaign 
by all media outlets was acknowledged by both 
domestic and foreign observers to be generally 
balanced and fair, especially when compared with 
previous parliamentary, and especially presidential 
elections. Broadcasters provided almost equal 
conditions for all participating parties, in line 
with the relevant provisions of the Electoral code.
However, the diametric difference between the 
normal media environment and the 28 campaign 
days was the reason for the positive assessment 
of the media’s campaign coverage. Yet, the 
more consequential, fundamental general media 
environment was largely ignored by observers.
Multiple but isolated instances of violations were 
documented by the OSCE’s Election Monitoring 
Mission, including pressure on public sector 
employees before and during Election Day. 
There were few instances of physical violence, 
no blatant threats, and almost no cases of open 
voting or obvious ballot stuffing, they said.
Across the country, domestic observers did note 
and record instances of apparent multiple voting. 
They also noted organized means of influencing 
the voting process. In fact, one of the new 
additions to this year’s election observation 
process was the role of the citizen observer and 
social media. There were a variety of efforts to 
actually observe and publicly share the results of 
the observation, in real-time.
The connection between observers and legal 
procedures remained weak, however. Of the 
Beginning in 2010, the 
Prosperous Armenia Party, 
had sought to create a 
new image as a genuine 
and potentially influential 
political player
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violations formally reported by local election 
commissions or official observers, none were 
formally recognized by the courts.
About 62 percent of potential voters participated 
in the ballot, with highest participation from the 
poorest marzes. The preliminary results were 
announced soon after the polls closed on May 6, 
with the Republican Party gaining a clear majority.
On May 7, the day after the polls, the disconnect 
between the high levels of frustration expressed 
on social media and the complete absence of any 
sort of public retort was notable. No political 
parties, regardless of the degree of campaign-
period acrimony, made a call for street protests. 
Indeed, parties generally did not publicly assess 
the process until later in the week.
Of the nine political forces (eight parties and one 
bloc) that registered for the May 2012 election 
under the proportional system, only six had won 
representation in the new parliament, and a few of 
them, just barely. According to the official results, 
the ruling Republican Party of Armenia received 
44 percent (664,640 votes) of the party list, 
which translated into 40 parliament mandates.
The Republicans also won 29 of the 41 
majoritarian districts, giving the party a total of 
69 of the 131 seats in the new parliament — just 
three votes more than the simple majority they 
need to form a new government.
As in 2007, the Prosperous Armenia Party ranked 
second after the Republicans in the party-list 
vote. In 2012, too, it ranked second but the 
454,673 votes it received in 2012 was more than 
double its 2007 total.
Prosperous Armenia’s share of seats in the new 
parliament increased to 37 (28 proportional plus 
nine single-mandate) compared with 25 in 2007 
(18 proportional plus seven single-mandate).
The ANC placed third in the proportional vote 
with 7.08 percent (106,903 votes), marginally over 
the seven percent minimum required for blocs to 
win representation in the new parliament. Their 
numbers were highest in Yerevan (at 11 percent), 
almost double the number of their votes as 
recorded in the regions.
The opposition Heritage Party, participating in 
parliamentary elections for the second time, 
received more votes (86,996) in 2012 than in 2007 
( 81,048 votes), but its percentage share fell very 
slightly from 5.8 percent in 2007 to 5.76 percent 
in 2012. Heritage, too, fared best in Yerevan, where 
they received nine percent of the vote.
The Dashnaktsutyun bore the greatest loss 
in 2012 and barely garnered the minimum 
five percent to qualify for parliamentary 
representation. The party won less than half 
the votes it received in 2007. Consequently, 
it has just five parliament deputies in the new 
legislature compared with 16 in the outgoing one.
Rivalries prevented the three opposition parties 
from winning single-mandate seats. Nowhere 
did they join forces, rather than split the 
opposition vote.
The Rule of Law party, too, barely surmounted 
the five percent barrier, garnering 5.51 percent of 
the proportional vote and six seats in Parliament. 
Their response to the significant decline in 
popularity was not to choose new leadership, but 
to keep the old leadership, ask the membership to 
leave the party and choose new members.
The international election monitors focused 
exclusively on the specific legal, technical and 
implementation aspects of the election and the 
extent to which the conduct of the election met 
Armenia’s commitments as a member of the OSCE 
and Council of Europe.
They appealed to the 
Constitutional Court to 
reverse the ruling that 
prohibits the post election 
publication of the names of 
those who actually voted. 
The Constitutional Court 
rejected the request, calling 
it an invasion of privacy
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They did not assess the environment as 
conditioned by the domestic political situation. 
The OSCE / ODIHR preliminary report noted as 
“an issue of great concern” the “general lack of 
confidence among political parties and the general 
public in the integrity of the election process,” but 
it did not place those misgivings in the context of 
the polarization of Armenian society following the 
violent clashes in Yerevan in March 2008 between 
security forces and Ter-Petrossian supporters 
protesting the apparent rigging of the outcome 
of the presidential ballot in Serzh Sargsyan’s 
favor. Nor did they place those misgivings in the 
context of the less-than-satisfactory experience 
of the Yerevan city or other local elections that 
have taken place in the period between the last 
nationwide election and this one.
However, the reports were very specific about the 
nature of improvements and also very specific 
in their citation of the variety and impact of 
violations.
The positive observations included the inclusive 
candidate registration process, a generally calm 
and peaceful Election Day, the smoothness of 
counting procedures including opening and 
voting and counting. The final OSCE / ODIHR 
report said the elections “were held under an 
improved legal framework,” “were characterized 
by a competitive, vibrant and largely peaceful 
campaign,” and “were administered in an overall 
professional and transparent manner prior to 
election day.”
The reports were also very precise about the 
character of violations. The disappearing ink 
(placed in passports to prove someone voted and 
prevent double voting) was a “fiasco” according 
to the Council of Europe. The deficiencies in the 
complaints and appeals process were causes for 
concern, according to the OSCE / ODIHR report. 
At the same time, it noted “violations of campaign 
provisions by electoral contestants, including the 
use of administrative resources and attempts to 
limit voters’ freedom of choice, [which] created 
an unequal playing field and ran counter to OSCE 
commitments.”
Finally, and possibly most significant, the 
percentage of polling stations where voting was 
assessed negatively was 10 percent, according 
to the Council of Europe, and nine percent 
according to the OSCE / ODIHR final report. Based 
on ODIHR’s 20 years of statistics, 10 percent 
means an election day of “high concern,” said the 
Council of Europe report.
In addition, one-fifth of “observed vote counts” 
or 20 percent were assessed negatively. In 
contrast, in 2007, the conduct of voting was 
evaluated as very good or good in 94 per cent 
of polling stations visited, and the vote count as 
“bad” or “very bad” in nearly 7 percent.
The reactions of the main foreign partners were 
generally positive. For both the US and the EU, 
the primary concern is that the ballot should 
be free and fair and thus contribute to greater 
democratization. At the same time, they prioritize 
domestic political stability as a prerequisite for 
continuity in all of Armenia’s regional and global 
efforts, in particular, its commitment to improved 
relations with turkey, and to a peaceful resolution 
of the Karabakh conflict.
The joint statement released on May 8 by Foreign 
Policy Chief Catherine Ashton and Enlargement 
Commissioner Stefan Füle reflected both those 
concerns. It also repeated the shortcomings 
registered by the osce observer mission.
“We welcome the efforts by the Armenian 
authorities to hold these parliamentary elections 
in a way which represents progress towards 
more transparent and more competitive 
elections,” the statement read. “However, 
the elections also demonstrated the need to 
address a number of issues in order to fully 
The positive observations 
included the inclusive 
candidate registration 
process, a generally calm 
and peaceful Election Day, 
the smoothness of counting 
procedures including opening 
and voting and counting
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meet internationally recognized democratic 
standards… We encourage the Armenian 
authorities to address the shortcomings that 
were identified by the OSCE / ODIHR as a matter 
of priority, ahead of the upcoming presidential 
elections scheduled for next year.”
The EU’s subsequent decision to postpone until 
after the presidential election a donors conference 
initially planned for this year was intended to 
underscore the need for the Armenian authorities 
to implement the OSCE’s recommendations for 
improving the electoral process.
Visiting Yerevan in early June, US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton similarly said she “was very 
pleased at the reports from international monitors 
about Armenia’s parliamentary elections last 
month being generally competitive and inclusive, 
where candidates were able to campaign for the 
most part without interference.”
But Clinton too urged the Armenian authorities 
to “work with the OSCE” to rectify “electoral 
problems” before the 2013 presidential ballot.
Predictably, local observers did in fact make 
assessments about the May 6 vote. There were 
27,000 domestic observers from 54 non-
governmental organizations, according to the 
Central Electoral Commission. Their views did 
not always correspond with those of international 
observers.
They all noted the same violations: fading ink, 
overcrowding, open voting, coached voting, 
some “observers” and “proxies” without 
appropriate documentation and identification, 
inaccuracies in voter lists including the names 
of persons who were deceased, or who have 
been absent from Armenia for a long time, or 
the inclusion of names of those from nearby 
villages or buildings.
The Armenian Helsinki Committee together 
with 10 other non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), including the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly 
Vanadzor office, the Open Society Foundation-
Armenia, Transparency International Anti-
Corruption Center, and the Cooperation for 
Democracy Center released a joint statement 
on the elections. The statement identified as 
positive the provision by the mass media of equal 
conditions for all parties during the election 
campaign, regulation of the distribution of printed 
campaign materials, and the procedures regulating 
voting processes in polling stations. Nevertheless, 
it stated with regret that serious actions were not 
implemented to “provide fair elections where the 
will of voters can be freely expressed.”
The 10 Armenian NGOs noted that “bribes, the 
abuse of administrative resources, political 
pressure exerted on government employees 
and private organizations, and the use of many 
other illegal mechanisms had a huge impact on 
the election process and election results.” The 
statement acknowledged a reduced number of 
“traditional” violations such as ballot stuffing 
and violence, but noted a new and improved 
mechanism which many called “people stuffing” 
— that is, utilizing double voting and other means 
to produce the desired ballots.
Thus these NGOs repeated that “a first and 
essential pre-condition for … democratic elections 
in Armenia” is the publishing of the names of 
those voters who did in fact vote.
The Joint Oversight Body, too, (consisting of the 
Armenian National Congress, the Prosperous 
Armenia Party and the Dashnaktsutyun) formed 
during the election campaign for the express 
purpose of overseeing the voting itself issued a 
statement concluding that the parliament formed 
as a result of the elections “does not reflect the 
true picture of popular support for the [various] 
political forces.” They based this on what they 
termed the “extremely dubious” voter lists and 
the official voter turnout figures.
The Republican leadership said repeatedly 
that the election was unprecedentedly free 
and fair, as is appropriate in the 21st century. 
To substantiate that claim, they adduced the 
No political parties, 
regardless of the degree of 
campaign-period acrimony, 
made a call for street 
protests
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preliminary evaluations of the election monitors, 
both international and domestic, who concluded 
that this election differed significantly from 
earlier ballots in terms of the improved level of 
organization and the fact that voting on may 6 
proceeded in a calm and orderly fashion.
Several prominent Prosperous Armenia members 
criticized the outcome, indicating that the results 
did not respect the people’s will.
The ARF-Dashnaktsutyun statement noted that 
the elections did not reflect the people’s will or 
the real correlation between the political forces.
At the same time, they conceded that a huge 
majority of Armenians “did not make a free and 
conscious choice,” but accepted bribes or yielded 
to pressure from the authorities and voted for the 
ruling party because of poverty and the adverse 
social conditions in which they live.
Heritage Party leader Raffi Hovannisian announced 
that the parliamentary elections “delivered a 
nationwide abyss deeper and more ominous than 
ever before.... The incumbent regime has imposed 
in unprecedented manner a cult of complicity 
upon large segments of the Armenian public, 
and despite its own democratic rhetoric has 
comported itself and the elections in defiance 
of civil liberties, constitutional rights, and an 
unfettered expression of the national will.”
The Free Democrats, who ran within the Heritage 
list, and who were established last year by long-
standing Ter-Petrossian supporters who quit the 
ANC, issued a statement saying, “The will of the 
people was subjected to a torrent of bribes.” Like 
the Dashnaktsutyun, the Free Democrats reached 
the conclusion that “the electoral violation 
mechanisms have been polished and are not 
applied in the polling stations, but outside and 
prior to election day, using all administrative and 
financial potential.”
Speaking on May 8 at a post-election rally on 
Freedom Square, ANC leader Levon Ter-Petrossian, 
who declined his parliament mandate, said his 
earlier assertion that each successive election in 
Armenia is worse than the previous one has been 
proven true. In order to counter the vigilance of 
election monitors, Ter-Petrossian continued, every 
time “the criminal regime ingeniously invents 
new and unexpected mechanisms for fraud.”
The Constitutional Court received a formal 
appeal from the Armenian National Congress to 
annul the results of the proportional list vote 
on the grounds of widespread fraud, including 
vote-buying and multiple voting. The appeal 
was rejected.
The alignment of forces within the new 
parliament became clear only on May 24, when 
Prosperous Armenia Chairman Tsarukyan formally 
announced that he did not consider it expedient 
to enter a new coalition with the Republicans. At 
the same time, Tsarukyan stressed that his party 
intends to play “a strictly constitutional, balanced 
role” in political and public life.
Other changes took place. Despite a requirement 
that every sixth name on the party slates be 
women, there is no requirement that every sixth 
member of a party’s delegation be a woman. Thus, 
a number of women who were in fact within the 
elected range, on the party lists, forfeited their 
positions in favor of others, all male.
Prosperous Armenia’s decision left the Republican 
Party of Armenia and its partner Rule of Law 
with a total of 75 parliament mandates between 
them.  This gave them an absolute majority and 
complete responsibility. 
Most laws, including the annual budget, are 
passed by a simple majority, providing that at 
least half the 131 deputies (or 66) are present 
and voting to constitute a quorum. The non-
One of the new additions 
to this year’s election 
observation process was 
the role of the citizen 
observer and social media. 
The connection between 
observers and legal 
procedures remained weak
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coalition parties (all but the Republicans and the 
Rule of Law) have 53 votes together and can, 
if they choose, present a serious challenge and 
alternative.
Still, the ruling party has demonstrated that it 
can summon the necessary quorum and votes 
when needed. They did so in October, when 
the Prosecutor chose to continue with the case 
against Vartan Oskanian, even after his election 
as a Parliament Deputy. With a majority vote, 
Oskanian was stripped of immunity and open for 
prosecution. The case remained open through 
the end of 2012, and continued to be branded 
political by local analysts and international 
observers, including the foreign media.
The remainder of the year was spent on a 
guessing game — who would run for president.
The four big unknowns that warranted following 
were Levon Ter-Petrossian, Robert Kocharian, 
Gagik Tsarukyan and Vartan Oskanian. In the end, 
none of them ran.
The anti-climactic announcements came 
in December after months of very public 
consultations among parties in what seemed to be 
a direction that would lead to a unity candidate 
as an alternative to the incumbent president. The 
expectations — and to some extent the not-so-
coy promises — did not come to pass.
In early December, Tsarukyan announced that 
neither he, nor any of his team — and that seemed 
to include Oskanian — would enter the contest.
Robert Kocharian kept quiet throughout. And 
Levon Ter-Petrossian announced quite late in 
the process that he too would not become a 
candidate again. He would not participate in 
a process that will legitimize Serzh Sargsyan’s 
re-election, he said. This left his erstwhile 
prime minister and head of the Freedom Party, 
Hrant Bagratyan, to throw in his hat. He was 
joined by political scientist Andrias Ghukasyan, 
Paruyr Hayrikian, an imprisoned dissident in the 
Soviet days and on the political scene since the 
independence movement, as well as independent 
candidates Aram Harutyunyan, Arman Melikyan, 
and Vardan Sedrakyan.
The Dashnaktsutyun, too, for the first time since 
1991, decided not to compete, claiming that the 
choice had already been made and the results 
are known.
The choices had been made. There was to be no 
competition from the larger players.
The field remained to Raffi Hovannisian, who had 
made clear his intent to run. His Parliamentary 
coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats did not 
support him nor offer a candidate of their own, 
saying these elections could not lead to regime 
change. 
MEDIA
In early 2012, Reporters Without Borders issued 
the annual Press Freedom Index, which saw 
Armenia jump 24 points. This reflected a calmer, 
more peaceful environment regarding journalists. 
During 2012, there were only two notable 
instances of journalists charged — one in Yerevan 
and one in Karabakh. Both were dropped.
There was no notable change in the newspaper 
sector. Broadcast media configurations remained the 
same. The Dashnaktsutyun affiliated media — print 
and broadcast — suffered financial pressures and 
contracted in size and coverage. The newspaper 
ceased publication. Government-supported or 
affiliated television stations enjoyed technological 
expansion. Online sources grew in number, but 
most remained news aggregators, with some 
opinion pieces and blogs. Investigative journalism 
remained the mission of one organization.
This calm uneventful environment was the 
outcome of the same approach adopted in 
the run-up to the parliamentary election — 
The Dashnaktsutyun bore 
the greatest loss in 2012 
and barely garnered the 
minimum five percent to 
qualify for parliamentary 
representation
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administrative resources and pressures used to 
assure a controlled and self-restricting system 
with many players — leaving a sophisticated, non-
violent plural playing field. By 2012, the financial 
support offered to broadcast and online media 
had already produced a predictable system: no 
holds barred criticism of whoever is considered 
opposition, more restrained but ongoing criticism 
— to serve as a release valve — for those who 
have earned the public’s ire, and no criticism of 
the top elite, their family or interests.
ARMY
The Armenian public remained deeply engaged 
in what seemed to be the Armenian Army’s main 
challenge — to reduce the number of non-
combat related deaths. In 2012, this issue was 
not just a matter of public discussion, but also 
several court cases.
The cases are followed not just by members of 
the soldiers’ families, but by a particularly active 
and persistent NGO, the Army Today.
Most of the deaths in question are labeled 
‘suicides’ by the authorities. This is a charge that 
most families reject, claiming rather that they are 
either cases of murder or forced suicide. These 
claims are often substantiated by physical traces 
on the bodies.
During the year, what started as tense stand-offs 
between the army leadership and the victims’ 
defenders, resulted in a cease-fire of sorts. This 
is either because the level of distrust is so deep 
that the reciprocal charges have no impact. Or, 
more likely, because the sides believe each has 
achieved some level of understanding by the 
other side. The evolution became obvious when 
the Defense Minister stated that officer training 
and officer promotion must become the tools by 
which to increase the ranks with qualitatively 
superior staff.
This problem is highlighting tensions between 
the older, traditional officers and those wishing 
to move to a civilian-led, more publicly 
transparent defense establishment. Even the 
military prosecutors have adopted a more 
flexible position in court, admitting to evidence 
incorrectly secured. Paradoxically, there 
continues to be greater public awareness of 
these military violations even as their number 
continues to decrease. 
The sniper attacks in June, along Armenia’s 
northeastern border with Azerbaijan, raised 
questions about the readiness and preparedness of 
Armenia’s fighting forces.
Three soldiers died and half a dozen were 
injured over several days of ceasefire violations. 
These violations were also a first — bringing the 
nearly daily infractions directly to Armenia’s 
border, and not Karabakh’s. Public reaction 
included statements by former soldiers and 
organizations that they are prepared to man 
Armenia’s borders. This came not at the expense 
of public opinion about the army. On the 
contrary, international and domestic opinion 
about the Armenian forces remain positive. 
Of all the fighting forces in the region, the 
Armenian forces are considered the best-
trained, most professional and combat-ready.
This was combined with other examples of 
positive public opinion regarding the army. 
The Defense Ministry’s Public Council included 
some new, independent thinkers, and tried to 
raise its perception in the eyes of the public. 
Although there is still no readiness to consider 
a professional army, given the continuing 
unresolved Karabakh conflict, the Armenian 
military has begun to accept professional 
officers, at certain ranks. In addition, the semi-
annual draft calls are less controversial, there 
is more faith in the health-related deferment 
process, as well as in the equitableness of the 
draft process in general.
The cases are followed not 
just by members of the 
soldiers’ families, but by 
a particularly active and 
persistent NGO, the Army 
Today
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Armenia remains engaged with both the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization and NATO. In 
October, Armenia ratified the CSTO agreement on 
the admissibility of non-CSTO member countries 
placing units of military significance on member 
countries territory. There was no broad debate 
either within or outside Parliament.
During the year, there was some limited debate 
over the usefulness of NATO’s Individual 
Partnership Action Plan, with detractors claiming 
that the only modifications made to Armenia’s 
armed forces are made to those units which serve 
directly with NATO’s peacekeeping forces.
POLICE
Armenia’s new police chief, appointed at the end 
of 2011, is attempting to indicate changes within 
the police force. Most of his efforts are perceived 
as superficial, beginning with new uniforms, 
and including the creation of visible substations 
throughout the capital. The comparison with 
Georgian road police remains the measurement 
against which changes are expected from the 
Armenian force.
Various traffic controls, including automatic cameras 
and speech checks, have resulted in decreased 
interaction between citizens and police, thus 
also decreasing the opportunities for bribes and 
corrupt behavior. Preferential treatment has not 
disappeared, and traffic rules continue to be broken 
with impunity by those who believe they can. Yet, 
there is a visible decrease in undue harassment.
Police reforms were not taken very seriously after 
a journalist who had published a photo indicating 
a legal infraction by the police chief was 
criminally charged on an alleged traffic matter. A 
public outcry resulted in the charge being thrown 
out. But the skepticism did not wear off.
At the same time, legal proceedings held against 
two top-level police officials, which ended with 
their conviction, was not perceived as an effort 
to reform the system. Rather, the public read the 
events as an internal battle between the previous 
and current guard.
There were fewer public demonstrations and 
fewer incidents of undue force used by police 
against citizens. 
CIVIL SOCIETY
The year kicked off with a new brand of civil 
society activism as a core group of young 
environmentalists occupied Mashtots Park in 
central Yerevan from January to early May, 
opposing the municipality’s all-too-opaque 
process of granting permits and allowing the 
construction of semi-permanent retail stalls. 
The law enforcement authorities reacted 
by dispatching police squads to guard the 
construction in progress. The persistence of 
activists in a stand-off with police to protect their 
right to peaceful protest brought the attention of 
many citizens, public figures, artists and even the 
Human Rights Defender
The resolution to months of negotiation and 
peaceful disobedience came when President 
Sargsyan, joined by the Yerevan mayor, paid an 
impromptu visit to the park, ordered the mayor 
to dismantle the constructed stalls on aesthetic 
grounds. Activists and legal commentators were 
quick to point out that Armenia’s Constitution 
and the Law on Local Self Governance, and 
the Law on Yerevan as Capital City, clearly set 
out parameters for local self-governance based 
on which a presidential decree conflicted with  
municipal rights. 
The unprecedented coming together of activists—
individuals with no organizational affiliations—set 
the tone for the rest of the year in civil society 
activism. Individuals, linked by alternative 
content and space for discourse online, helped 
by the organizing power of social media, marked 
a new kind of public interest activism, forming 
short-term and ad-hoc alliances to influence 
policy, elections, and public opinion. 
The comparison with 
Georgian road police remains 
the measurement against 
which changes are expected 
from the Armenian force
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The burden and responsibility of mobilizing 
citizens seemed to move from formal NGOs 
and community organizations to individuals 
acting on their own and in small clusters. 
Mushrooming instances of activism included 
cultural preservation issues such as the famed 
produce market in the center of Yerevan, the 
Roman-style circus and other buildings, as well as 
the relocation of cultural monuments from their 
original locations around Armenia to the Museum 
of Armenian History in Yerevan.
Environmental protection efforts were the most 
visible. The year started when hundreds of 
activists caravaned to the mining site in the 
Teghut Forest, which served all year as the symbol 
for mining interests receiving disproportionate 
support over environmental needs. 
If the environmental and other initiatives were 
continuations from last year, the popular sentiment 
against unrestrained illegal activities by oligarchs 
rose to the surface  following the death by 
beating of a young doctor. Vahe Avetyan and two 
colleagues were violently attacked by guards at a 
popular restaurant facility. The colleagues survived 
but he died of wounds inflicted by the security 
personnel. The restaurant is owned by the family 
of parliament member Ruben Hayrapetyan, who 
was forced to resign under public pressure. The 
matter remains in court, with protracted delays. 
Crowd-sourced election observations in May 
were another expression of the engagement of 
individual citizens in civic action. 
Most initiatives lacked strategic will and vision. 
In many of the cases, activists disagreed on 
structure and objectives, and in many situations 
refused to come together with organizations 
and formal groups, such as political parties, 
aligned with their interests, out of fear of being 
mislabeled. 
Civil society organizations continued to push 
forward their long-term advocacy campaign 
(started in 2009) on reforming and overhauling 
legislation governing the non-profit sector. The 
campaign gained renewed momentum after the 
parliamentary elections. A coalition of several 
dozen groups worked with the Ministry of Justice 
to craft a white paper on long-term strategies 
for non-profit sector development. The paper 
which was completed in late 2012, was slated for 
government consideration and approval before 
the presidential elections in February 2013. 
The process of delivering this common vision 
was interrupted briefly when a Public Council-
prepared (at the behest of President Sargsyan) 
concept paper raised questions on the lack of 
coordination in the government apparatus. Given 
the source of the concept document, many 
observers sounded alarms of rapid backsliding 
in democratic norms, in line with government 
initiatives on non-profit organizations in the 
Russian Federation. The preemptive and boisterous 
opposition to the Public Council document 
rendered it dead on arrival.
The US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) Civil Society Sustainability Index 
registered progress, and placed Armenia (4.0) in 
second place in the Eurasia sub-category of the 
Index just behind Ukraine (3.5). Many activists 
and analysts, however, agreed that while the 
ranking was an indication that there had 
been sector-wide movement toward progress, 
serious structural and political impediments 
remained in place for long-term progress and 
sustainability.
The political impediments in fact seemed to 
grow in 2012 as pressure was placed on the 
Civilitas Foundation, an organization governed by 
Armenia’s non-governmental sector legislation. 
Investigations commenced in connection with 
the political pressure on Vartan Oskanian, who 
established Civilitas in 2008, and CivilNet.am, an 
independent media site, in 2011 and by the end of 
the year, stretched to what the National Security 
Service claimed was protecting Civilitas’s rights, 
from Oskanian. Civilitas said its rights had not 
been violated, and a government agency did not 
unilaterally have the right to define a civil society 
organization’s interests and take steps to ‘defend’ 
them, citing this as a dangerous precedent. The 
case continues.
One-fifth of “observed vote 
counts” or 20 percent were 
assessed negatively
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DOMESTIC OUTLOOK
If there are no surprises, then Serzh Sargsyan will 
be elected. But that election will introduce more 
questions than answers. The main question will 
be how the political forces will be configured, and 
the make-up of the government after the election. 
The nature of the relationship between authorities 
and opposition will be determine accordingly.
Elections are unlikely to be free and fair. 
Administrative resources, bribes and other 
methods of election fraud are certain to be 
utilized because the authorities will be seriously 
challenged to secure a respectable number of 
voters and votes.
Regardless of post-election developments, the 
three parties not participating in the election — 
Prosperous Armenia, Armenian National Congress 
and the ARF-Dashnaktsutyun — will review their 
positions and re-organize in order to restore the 
confidence of their electors.
Depending on the Republican Party’s approach to 
the 2017 and 2018 elections and its appetite for 
holding on to power, its actions and relations with 
other political parties will either be inclusive or 
competitive. In that context, the Republican Party 
may even consider introducing changes to the 
constitution to pursue that goal.  
Despite the authorities’ promises to further 
deepen democratization processes, serious 
progress cannot be expected given the absence of 
checks and balances and the Republican Party’s 
absolute hold on power.
POLICY OPTIONS
Given the population’s deep disenchantment and 
sustained emigration, regardless of the election 
outcome, the new authorities must use the post-
election period as a new beginning and attempt to 
change the unhealthy environment in the country.
The ruling party obstructed efforts of the opposition 
parties to review the make-up of the Parliament 
to remove the majoritarian provision and allow 
for an entirely party-based election process. The 
Republicans must return to that issue and through 
open debate, arrive at constructive change.
Through intrigue and pressure, the authorities 
succeeded in emptying the political field and 
assuring their own re-election. The civic 
activists and others who will need to enter 
the political arena will have to work harder to 
secure a legislative environment for new political 
configurations to take shape.
The opposition parties must attempt to 
sustain the environment of understanding and 
collaboration that was created during the election 
year, by seeking common solutions to the most 
important social, political and economic problems.
The media’s successful implementation of the 
electoral law and opening of the media field for 
the limited 28-day campaign period under the 
watchful eyes of the international observers must 
be allowed to continue year long thus contributing 
to the formation of open and healthy discourse.
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In 2012, the second wave of 
the global economic crisis 
seemed to have passed, but 
the economic environment 
around the world remained 
uncertain and unpredictable. 
The prolonged global debt crisis 
combined with the consequences 
of the 2008 financial crisis led 
to a contraction in demand 
and dampened global growth 
prospects even more. The 
evolution of the global economy 
continued to depend on two 
sets of choices — one facing 
the developed economies, the 
other challenging the emerging 
economies.
The main dilemma before the developed economies 
was the same as in 2011 — how to balance between 
growth and debt-reduction. For them, the main 
policy recommendations were that these nations 
focus on short-term economic growth while 
targeting mid-term fiscal adjustments, continued 
stabilization of the banking and financial sectors, 
and also structural reforms. Some countries 
registered limited success in achieving these goals; 
others continued to struggle. For most of them, 
the policy of choice to stimulate growth remained 
monetary policy through quantitative easing. But 
this generally failed to achieve the desired goal.
The challenge facing emerging economies was 
how to maintain their dynamics of growth. For 
China, the biggest of the emerging powers, the 
challenge remained making the necessary demand 
adjustments focusing on domestic consumption to 
minimize the global trade imbalances.
In 2012, Armenia’s challenges and policy choices 
did not fall squarely in one or the other track, 
but a mixture of both. The end-of-year economic 
activity rate of seven percent was not manifested 
in other macroeconomic indicators, such as 
poverty reduction, tax revenues, increase in 
personal income and standard of living. During 
the year, the International Monetary Fund, too, 
expressed certain reservations about the revised 
activity rate projections.
Economic developments in Armenia were 
erratic, punctuated by pre-election promises 
and hopes, rising inequality, shrinking foreign 
direct investment, greater dependence on 
resource-based industries, and ever-deepening 
structural constraints. 
Following the May parliamentary elections, the 
new government (which comprised mostly the 
old government ministers) presented its economic 
program and, later in the year, a new budget. 
Both were seriously criticized by the four non-
coalition parties represented in parliament; 
they argued that neither the program nor the 
budget were based on a clear ideology or policy 
direction. Both documents were extremely 
conservative, and could not stimulate economic 
growth or satisfy public expectations. Despite 
the government’s insistence that Armenia’s 
debt-GDP ratio and level of inflation are not 
obstructions to fiscal and monetary policy, 
its policies were and remained restrictive by 
keeping borrowing costs high and reducing 
the budget deficit even below the admissible 
three percent of GDP.
Both the program and the budget manifested the 
government’s risk-averse cautionary approach. 
This triggered the opposition’s calls for a more 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policy, a higher 
minimum wage, and lower interest rates to 
stimulate real growth and create jobs. 
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THE ECONOMIC PICTURE
During 2012, Armenia’s economic growth 
prospects were revised several times both by the 
government and by international organizations. 
The Armenian government’s 2012 growth forecast 
was initially 4.2 percent, while the International 
Monetary Fund projected 4.3 percent. However, 
the first three quarters saw a bountiful harvest 
and successful exploitation of Armenia’s largest 
mine, and this brought an upward revision of 
the real growth forecast to 6.2 percent by the 
International Monetary Fund and to 7.1 percent 
by the government. In absolute numbers, the 
nominal Gross Domestic Product in 2012 is 
expected to have reached approximately four 
trillion AMD (USD $10 billion.)
Despite the impressive economic activity index 
rates from January to November 2012, the 
fundamental issues of the Armenian economy 
remained unresolved. Economic growth in 2012 
resulted from one-time and temporary factors 
and was not based on long-term and sustainable 
policy decisions. Growth based on such volatile 
and short-lived causes, such as favorable 
weather conditions for agriculture and the 
exploitation of non-renewable natural resources, 
could not have the potential to trigger long-
term economic development.
Overall, during January-November 2012, economic 
activity in Armenia increased by 7.1 percent 
as compared to the same period in 2011. The 
month-to-month fluctuations resembled that of 
the previous years, again reflecting the high level 
of seasonality and the low diversification of the 
economy. Food, beverages and extracted materials 
comprised around 74.5 percent of production in 
Armenia during January-November 2012. With 
14.6 percent growth from January to November 
2012, mining and its derivative industries were the 
cornerstone of economic development in Armenia. 
During the same period, the service sector grew 
by 11.1 percent and agriculture by 8.3 percent. 
The growth in these sectors spilled over to other 
sectors of Armenian economy. Production of 
electricity and consumption of gas, for example, 
saw an increase of 14.1 percent during the 11-month 
period, and production of the water supply 
increased by 33.8 percent during the same period.
According to Central Bank surveys, despite an 
increase in the economic activity index, consumer 
confidence in the third quarter of 2012 decreased 
by 4.5 percent as compared to the same period of 
the previous year and by 2.9 percent compared 
to the second quarter of 2012. Moreover, in 2012 
consumers had significantly less favorable buying 
intentions and more pessimistic attitudes towards 
the future of the Armenian economy. 
Inflation fell in 2012. According to the 2013 state 
budget, average inflation for 2012 is expected to 
reach 2.4 percent, compared to the 4.5 percent 
projected in the 2012 state budget. According 
to the official methodology, price fluctuations in 
the food market account for around 53 percent 
of average inflation, while prices of services and 
non-consumer products form 31 and 16 percent 
of inflation, respectively. As a result, during 
January-November 2012, the overall increase 
in price levels was dampened by lower fruit 
(21.6 percent) and vegetable (6.5 percent) prices 
and amounted to a mere 2.5 percent compared to 
the same period in 2011.
Despite being within a manageable range, inflation 
in Armenia contains high socio-economic risks. 
Thus, even though the average inflation rate from 
January to November was benign, during the same 
period the price of sugar increased by 12 percent, 
confectionery prices rose by 11.4 percent, coffee and 
tea by 12.1 percent and meat products by 7.3 percent. 
Given that the meat consumption norm is met only 
among the top 10 percent of society, and for the rest, 
meat consumption is 40 percent below the norm, 
and also given that sugar is a necessary commodity, 
these price growth trends are worrisome.
The prices for non-food items were mostly 
conditioned by significant price increases for 
Despite the impressive 
economic activity index rates 
from January to November 
2012, the fundamental issues 
of the Armenian economy 
remained unresolved
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both petroleum and diesel. From January to 
November 2012, petroleum rose 10.6 percent 
and diesel 9.1 percent compared with the same 
period of the previous year. Another negative 
trend affecting one of the high value-added 
export-oriented sectors of Armenia’s economy 
was rising gold prices, both on the international 
and, consequently, in Armenian markets. In 
the first eleven months, jewelry prices shot up 
17.3 percent, and as a consequence, demand 
decelerated and the sector shrank by 12.5 percent. 
Jewelry exports during the first nine months of 
2012 fell by 10 percent to $125.2 million. The 
clothing and textile sector experienced a rather 
high 8.6 percent price increase during January-
November 2012. Prices in the service sector 
also increased, affected mainly by 13 percent 
fee increases for legal and banking services and 
8.9 percent for healthcare.
In 2012, the sources of inflation in Armenia 
continued to be microeconomic in nature and 
were conditioned by supply-side pressures. The 
consequences of the price increases, however, lead 
to macroeconomic tensions, such as stagnation in 
affected economic sectors (e.g. jewelry) and social 
consequences for the population (e.g. higher prices 
for meat and sugar). In other words, prices in 
Armenia increased not because consumers decided 
to spend more, but because of variations in supply 
and in prices in specific markets. 
Years of consistent inflation since the 2008 
economic crisis have resulted in a continuous 
drop in purchasing power for most Armenian 
households, hitting the poorest segments of the 
population especially hard. Overall, consumption 
by the richest 10 percent of households is 8.5 
times greater than consumption by the poorest 
10 percent. Even more disturbing is the fact that 
for this poorest 10 percent, consumption of all food 
products, with the exception of bread, is below the 
norms set by Armenia’s Ministry of Health.
2012 saw both a rise in average household income, 
as well as an increase in the income divide. The 
per capita monetary income of the richest 10 percent 
of households exceeds that of the poorest 10 percent 
by around 15 times. A difference greater than seven 
is seen as a source of social tension. Moreover, 
the gap between monetary incomes of the richest 
and the poorest has widened since the crisis. The 
official poverty rate registered a miniscule annual 
decrease and according to the latest available data is 
at 35 percent, down from 35.8 percent previous year. 
In other words, according to the National Statistics 
Service, more than one third of the Armenian 
population continues to live in poverty. Further, 
the share of the extremely poor in the population 
has increased and now comprises 3.7 percent: over 
120,000 people in Armenia — the extremely poor — 
live on less than $2 a day.
In Armenia, the minimum consumer basket is 
46,566 AMD (nearly $125.) In 2012, the minimum 
monthly wage was only 32,500 AMD (nearly 
$81). Households living on a minimum wage spend 
their entire monetary income on food products, 
while an average Armenian family spends 
52.7 percent of its income on food items. Around 
55 percent of those below the poverty line live in 
households where more than two family members 
are employed. A bill increasing the minimum 
wage by 2,500 AMD monthly (around $6) was 
passed this year, under heavy criticism for 
being both unfair and insufficient: even with the 
increased minimal nominal wages those receiving 
minimum wages can afford only 75 percent of the 
minimum consumer basket.
2012 — the year of parliament elections and 
presidential pre-election — was expected to 
bring about a 6.2 percent increase of average 
nominal salaries and a 0.1 percent decrease in 
unemployment. In January-November 2012, nominal 
monthly minimum wages, as compared to the 
same period of the previous year, increased by 
5.2 percent, comprising 118,408 AMD ($295). The 
financial sector continued to be the leader with the 
highest paying jobs in the labor market with average 
nominal wages comprising 305,269 AMD. Nominal 
wages in Information Technologies (with 260,024 
Years of consistent inflation 
since the 2008 economic 
crisis have resulted in 
a continuous drop in 
purchasing power for most 
Armenian households
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AMD) and mining (with 257,839 AMD) follow the 
financial sector in offering top paying jobs.
The service and retail sectors hired the greatest 
number of employees during the first nine months 
of 2012. Despite the slight decrease in the official 
unemployment rate, in 2012 the unemployment 
rate continues to be at threatening levels: the 
share of unemployed among Armenia’s working-
age population varied from 20.1 percent in the 
first quarter of the year to 16 percent in the third 
quarter. Some 39 percent of those unemployed 
have never had a job. 
Socio-economic tensions, in their turn, continued 
to lead to out-migration. In 2012, around 43,000 
more people left the country than entered. 
That is essentially the same as Armenia’s state 
migration agency’s estimate for each of the last 
five years.
2012 has been a positive year for Armenia in 
international ratings. Armenia significantly 
improved its position both in the World Bank 
Doing Business ranking and in the World Economic 
Forum Global Competitiveness Index. According 
to the World Bank annual ranking on the ease of 
doing business, Armenia improved its position by 
18 points, ranking 32 among 185 states. The major 
categories that saw improvement were protecting 
investors (+ 73 points), ease of paying taxes 
(+44 points), ease of getting electricity (+42 points) 
and ease of receiving construction permits 
(+3 points). Despite considerable improvement of 
the rating in paying taxes, where Armenia rated 
108 out of 185 countries, that category remains the 
major challenge to doing business. Other categories 
which continue to hamper doing business 
in Armenia are “trading across borders” and 
“enforcing contracts.” Getting electricity, although 
less difficult, remains an obstacle as well.
In terms of global competitiveness, Armenia 
improved its index position by ten points, 
appearing 82nd among 144 states in 2012. 
Armenia raised its indexes considerably in goods 
market efficiency (+36 points) and macroeconomic 
stability (+31 points). At the same time, Armenia 
dropped in the all-important categories of 
“infrastructure” and “technological readiness.” 
Moreover, according to the World Economic 
Forum report, the Armenian executives who were 
engaged in the assessment of the competitiveness 
of the Armenian economy considered corruption 
(around 16.9 percent of the interviewees), 
inefficient governance (13.6 percent), access 
to financing (12.7 percent) and tax regulations 
(10.5 percent) as the most problematic factors for 
doing business in Armenia.
Despite improvements in global rankings, 
entrepreneurship in Armenia remains a challenge, 
especially for small and medium businesses. 
According to official data, there are 172,000 
enterprises registered in Armenia, and 52 percent 
of these companies – mostly small businesses 
– are not operational. According to the Global 
Competitiveness Index, corruption, an inefficient 
government bureaucracy, tax regulations and the 
absence of judicial independence remain the most 
problematic factors for doing business.
In contrast to improved ratings on international 
scales, foreign direct investment has slumped by 
around 53.8 percent in the January to September 
period compared with the corresponding period in 
2011. Direct investments from nearly all countries 
declined significantly. During the first three 
quarters of 2012, the largest investor, Russia, 
invested 79.9 percent less and the second largest 
investor, France, 55.2 percent less than in the same 
period of the previous year. The United States, 
previously the third largest country in terms of 
foreign direct investment volume to Armenia, 
reduced its investment by 85.7 percent. On the 
other hand, the inflow of foreign direct investment 
from Switzerland increased grew from $0.3 
million to $38 million. Approximately 90 percent 
of the Swiss investment was directed into mining 
industries. Overall, mining and telecommunications, 
amounting to $75.5 million and $49.2 million 
respectively, accounted for 34.1 percent and 
22.2 percent of total foreign direct investments.
Even with the increased 
minimal nominal wages those 
receiving minimum wages 
can afford only 75 percent 
of the minimum consumer 
basket
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In spite of improving positions in a number of 
sectors, Armenia in 2012 remained problematic, 
according to the Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index: Armenia scored 
34 (on a scale where 0 is perceived to be highly 
corrupt and 100 is perceived to be very clean.) 
With this score Armenia shared 105-112 places 
among 176 countries. Education, the police and the 
courts were assessed as the most corrupt sectors.
Industrial output in January-November 2012 
reached one trillion AMD ($2.5 billion), mostly in 
mining, metallurgy, tobacco products, beverages 
and furniture. Recycling became one of the fastest 
growing industries, growing 2.7 times in the first 
eleven months of 2012 compared to the same 
period in 2011. However, the share of recycling 
in total industrial output remains negligible, 
amounting to only three billion AMD. The Central 
Bank said that by year’s end, the sector would 
achieve 8.5 to 10.5 percent growth.
The industrial sector’s major problem remains 
low diversification and dependence on external 
markets. Production output for most goods 
was sporadic. In 2012, the government again 
highlighted several industries as priority sectors 
— including IT, tourism, agriculture, and mining.
Retail remains the largest sector of Armenia’s 
economy. In January-November, the retail turnover 
reached 1.14 trillion AMD ($2.8 billion), marking a 
growth of 2.2 percent compared to the same period in 
the previous year. But given the 2.5 percent inflation 
rate, real retail trade during the eleven month period 
did not change significantly. Accounting for around 
65.5 percent of the total retail sales, shops and 
supermarket chains continued to dominate the sector, 
driving agricultural and open-air consumer markets 
out of the sector. Overall, the retail sector in Armenia 
is highly consolidated and monopolized, with nearly 
all major retail channels controlled by businessmen 
with government connections.
Due to favorable weather conditions, agricultural 
output reached 787.8 billion AMD ($1.9 billion) 
during the first eleven months of 2012, growing 
by impressive 8.3 percent compared to the same 
period last year. Crop production contributed the 
largest share of this growth at 12.8 percent, while 
the livestock sector increased by 3.2 percent.
Despite the impressive growth rate, the structural 
issues of the sector remain unresolved: the 
productivity level of the sector continues to be 
among the lowest in Armenia’s economy. The 
agricultural sector in Armenia is fragmented and 
consists of a large number of micro and small-
scale subsistence-driven farms and households. 
Moreover, being the largest employer (about 
39 percent of the population of working age), the 
sector is still producing far below its capacity.
According to the National Statistical Service, during 
the first eleven months of 2012, the service sector 
amounted to 870.6 billion AMD ($2.2 billion), 
showing an increase of 11.1 percent against a growth 
rate forecast at 3.5 – 5.5 percent. Information 
technologies and telecommunications remain 
the most productive sector. By the end of 2012, 
25 percent growth was expected in a sector with 
some 350 companies, employing 10,000 people. 
After suffering severe losses in the global crisis, 
the construction sector is about half of its 
2008 size. The Central Bank forecast a 2.5 to 
4.5 percent increase in construction in 2012, yet 
during January-November the sector contracted 
by a further 0.7 percent, and by the end of the 
year is expected to hit its lowest level since 2006. 
Around 16.2 percent of the sector is state-funded 
and a further 8.4 percent are financed by loans 
from international organizations. With around 
24.4 percent decrease in funding as compared to 
the same period of the previous year, the World 
Bank remained the biggest sponsor of construction 
among the international organizations in January 
to November 2012. At the same time, the Asian 
Development Bank and the German Development 
Bank increased their construction funding four 
times. Humanitarian aid-supported construction 
contracted by around 79.4 percent.
Armenian executives 
considered corruption, 
inefficient governance, 
access to financing and 
tax regulations as the most 
problematic factors for doing 
business in Armenia
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In 2012, tourism enjoyed yet another good year 
with an 9.4 percent increase, to 603,074, in 
the number of international tourists visiting in 
January to September. The main source countries 
of arrivals to Armenia are Russia (17.2 percent), 
the US (13.1 percent), France (8.7 percent) and 
United Kingdom (8.5 percent). According to 
official expectations, by year’s end, tourism was 
to hit the 800,000 visitor mark, compared with 
758,000 in 2011.
The external trade turnover during January 
to November period of 2012 reached $5.13 
million, growing by 3.5 percent compared to 
the same period in 2011. The trade balance 
deficit reached nearly $2.5 billion, a slight 
increase of 0.5 percent. During the first nine 
months of 2012, Armenia’s top three trading 
partners were the Russian Federation with 
23.6 percent, Germany with 7.5 percent and 
China with 7.4 percent of Armenia’s trade 
turnover. Accounting for around 19.6 percent of 
Armenian exports and 25 percent of imports, 
Russia remained both the most important buyer 
of Armenian goods and the biggest source of 
imported goods to Armenia. Moreover, during 
January-November 2012 total turnover with 
Russia increased by another 22.1 percent. During 
the same period, the total trade turnover 
with the countries of European Union fell by 
six percent, and comprised around 29.5 percent 
of total external sales. Trade turnover within 
the region remains negligible and sporadic; trade 
with Georgia constitutes only 2.2 percent of the 
total external trade turnover of Armenia, while 
Turkey and Iran account for 3.7 and 5.6 of the 
total foreign trade respectively.
Triggered mainly by sales of food products, the 
overall value of exports from Armenia increased 
by 6.7 percent, reaching $1.3 billion, during the 
first eleven months of 2012. At the same time, 
the export sales of other major export-oriented 
sectors plummeted — jewelry by 11 percent, metals 
by 8.9 percent and mining products by 1.2 percent 
drop. The three sectors along with food and 
beverage production constitute around 82 percent of 
Armenian exports.
The top two external markets for Armenian goods 
were Russia with 19.6 percent of total export sales 
and Germany with 11.3 percent, followed by Bulgaria 
with 9.4 percent and Belgium accounting for 
9.3 percent. Due to low diversification of the export-
oriented industries, which are mainly concentrated 
around such low value-added fields as mining 
and metallurgy, the success of Armenian industry 
remains vulnerable to developments in world 
economy, in particular the price of metals.
In January-November 2012 imports grew by 
2.5 percent, reaching $3.8 billion. The import 
structure saw almost no change: the main imports 
remain energy products, machinery and transport 
equipment. The top three sources of imported 
goods to Armenia also remained the same: Russia 
accounting for around 25 percent of Armenian 
imports, China with 9.3 percent of imports and 
Germany with 6.2 percent.
Between January and December 2012, the 
Armenian dram (AMD) depreciated against 
most major currencies. In 2012 the average 
annual exchange rate against US dollar devalued 
by 8 percent and reached 402.1 AMD: 1 USD, as 
compared to 372.5 AMD:1 USD in 2011. Despite 
its ups and dwns, the Euro also showed an 
upward trend: with an average exchange rate of 
532.3 AMD:1 Euro in December 2012 as opposed 
to 504.6 AMD:1 Euro in the corresponding 
period of the previous year. The annual 
exchange rate in 2012 reached 516.54 AMD: 1 
Euro, 0.4 percent less than that of the previous 
year. During January-December 2012 the AMD 
depreciated by around two percent against the 
Ruble. Despite the relatively stable exchange 
rate and the far higher interest rates paid on 
AMD deposits than on foreign currency deposits, 
the Armenian public has less trust in the AMD 
than in the USD and Euro; as of November 2012, 
foreign currency deposits comprised 2.3 times 
AMD deposits.
The US, previously the third 
largest country in terms of 
foreign direct investment 
volume to Armenia, 
reduced its investment by 
85.7 percent
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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
As 2012 was an election year, it necessarily 
affected the pace of the government’s announced 
reforms. The government chose to focus more on 
the solution of specific contained problems rather 
than on structural change. The improvement 
registered in certain macroeconomic indicators 
was not the result of long term strategy or 
structural reform; rather, it was the consequence 
of short-term conditions, as well as one-time 
government intervention in one or two sectors. 
Subsidies for fuel and fertilizer in the agriculture 
sector, temporary exemptions from Value Added 
Tax for large industrial companies were reflected 
in positive economic activity.
The notable long-term reform of 2012 was the 
consolidation and clearance of business-related 
legislation. The Regulatory Guillotine program, 
with $2 million in financing from the international 
community, had started at the end of 2011. The 
project aims to reduce by 30 percent the 26,000 
laws which regulate businesses, and simplify 
another 30 percent. The goal of the project is to 
remove, in a short timespan, the number of the 
unnecessary regulatory measures and normative 
acts and reduce inefficient expenses.
This year, as last, fiscal policy reform focused 
on tax and customs administration and tax 
collection. Some steps were undertaken, including 
the introduction of the risk-based inspections, 
with enterprises divided into three levels of 
likely risk and the list of companies to be audited 
are to be published. The success of this effort 
will depend on implementation, which is where 
Armenian legislation is chronically ineffective.
The customs service continues to be marked by 
arbitrariness and inconsistencies. This can be 
explained both by a lack of commitment by officials 
and existing gaps in the customs code.
The government’s 2012 intent was to bring 
the tax and tariff revenue to GDP ratio to 
17.36 percent, up from the 17.1 in 2011. In other 
words, the expected increase in the tax to GDP 
ratio was a mere 0.26 percentage points. Even the 
government’s action plan, meager as it is, had 
targeted a 0.3 – 0.4 percentage point rise annually. 
Armenia lags significantly behind its neighbors 
in this indicator. This lukewarm commitment 
to reform is probably why the government’s 
implementation was assessed as unsatisfactory by 
the International Monetary Fund. The IMF stated 
the obvious — by providing equal conditions for 
all players, the business environment will improve 
and lead to a recovery of the Armenian economy. 
These equal conditions must apply to tax and 
customs administration as well.
The transition to such an environment is 
rendered difficult, or nearly impossible, because 
the necessary reforms will most hurt the 
economic and political elite. Government officials, 
responsible for implementing reforms, are often 
those most at risk of the impact of those reforms. 
Yet, they are the ones who must mandate the 
changes — both in legislation, and especially 
in implementation. 2012 was no exception — 
although the period prior to the parliamentary 
elections and the period prior to the presidential 
election might have obliged alternative actions, 
an easing of the environment and decreasing 
dissatisfaction. On the other hand, such moves 
would have resulted in weakening the resources of 
those in the elite whose support was necessary to 
securing the election (or re-election) of the elite. 
Thus, the pre-election periods of promises hope 
did not translate to implementation and action.
This year, with EU financing of $1.45 million, 
German and Lithuanian experts have worked 
with the State Anti-Trust Commission to build 
capacity in order to better protect the interests 
of consumers against price fixing. As a result, 
legislation increased the commission’s powers. 
Nevertheless, the chronic problem of weak 
implementation has impeded prevention of unfair 
price manipulation. 
Despite a 2011 launch date, the Voluntary Pension 
Fund system has still not been introduced. 
Although most of the legal framework is in place, 
the private sector remains unprepared to solicit 
and manage funds. The fundamental impediment 
Education, the police and 
the courts were assessed as 
the most corrupt sectors
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is the absence of sufficient interest from outside 
investment institutions. Yet, the continuing 
delay in the start of the voluntary pension fund 
management embodies risks for the entire pension 
fund system, since the Mandatory Pension Fund 
system must go into operation in January 2014, and 
the period until then, was to have been used to 
overcome hurdles and enable smooth management.
Within the framework of pension reform, payroll 
tax procedures will change in 2013. A single 
employer deduction will combine mandatory 
social contributions and income tax. In addition, 
all accounting must become electronic.
As a result of these changes, in 2013 employers 
will be obliged to pay an additional 775 AMD per 
100,000 AMD in salary. Government calculations 
indicate that the increase will be compensated 
by reduced administrative expenses incurred by 
making separate payments.
GOVERNMENT PROGRAM
Most cabinet members stayed in place after the 
May elections and the formation, by law, of a 
new government. That government presented 
its development program for the next five-year 
period. The program passed with only the ruling 
Republican Party and its coalition partner Rule of 
Law voting in favor. The other four non-coalition 
parties voted against the program.
The government program revolves around three 
priorities.
The first is raising economic competitiveness 
as the primary prerequisite for long-term stable 
growth. The government plans to continue 
efforts to improve the business and investment 
environment, expand innovation technologies, 
provide equal conditions for all market players, as 
well as facilitate proportional development of the 
regions outside Yerevan.
The second priority of the government program 
is to develop human capital. For this purpose 
government plans to improve access to quality 
education, to health and cultural services, to 
reduce the causes of poverty and inequality 
among the socially vulnerable by assuring access 
to education and employment, and to create 
favourable conditions for the preservation of 
Armenia’s spiritual religious and cultural heritage.
The third priority of the government program 
is institutional capacity building. In order 
to strengthen human capital, the government 
plans to implement actions to strengthen public 
institutions, regulate the internal and external 
activities of various institutions to avoid 
redundancies, active cooperation between the 
private and public sectors, as well as focusing on 
“defining the rules of the game and providing 
quality service” in government operations.
The government program for 2012-2017 targets 
five to seven percent in annual GDP growth and 
a tax collection increase of 0.3-0.4 percent of 
GDP annually. Finally, the government program 
foresees an eight to 10 percent reduction in 
poverty. This means that in 2017, poverty will 
hover between 25 and 28 percent, or equal to 
the 2007 level — leaving one out of every four 
people in poverty. 
Although the program’s passage was a foregone 
conclusion, given the Republican Party’s absolute 
majority in Parliament, nevertheless pre-vote 
discussions were substantial and critical.
The four other parties agreed that the program did 
not address the fundamental problems facing the 
country, and did not offer corresponding solutions. 
They pointed out that the same government which 
had achieved none of its economic goals was now 
proposing another program, probably equally 
ineffective — since there was no specific targeting 
of poverty reduction, the causes of emigration, or 
job creation.
The top three sources of 
imported goods to Armenia 
remained the same: Russia 
accounting for around 
25 percent, China with 
9.3 percent of imports and 
Germany with 6.2 percent
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INCONSEQUENTIAL GROWTH
OUTLOOK
Economic prospects, globally for 2013, appear 
much rosier than those of recent years. If those 
projections come true, Armenia’s two biggest 
economic partners -- the EU and Russia - - will  
register economic growth and that will obviously 
be beneficial to Armenia.
The World Bank projects a 4.3 percent growth 
in Armenia’s economic activity, while Armenia’s 
government projects 7.1 percent. Armenia’s 
optimistic projection can only be realized if there 
is a fundamental change in the government’s 
ideology and policies. This will improve the 
business environment and re-attract foreign 
direct investment, which fell decidedly in 2012.
Following the presidential election, one of three 
developments is possible: a new government 
with a new program, the old government with 
a new program, or the old goverment with the 
old program. The last is the most likely and most 
undesirable since it will mean a continuation of 
the policies of the past five years and a deepening 
of the economic stagnation and institutional 
deficiencies.
In 2013, Armenia’s economic challenge will 
remain the same – that  the intended economic 
growth be reflected in macroeconomic indicators 
such as poverty reduction, job creation and 
higher wages, together with a significant 
improvement in the tax collection to GDP ratio, 
and finally, implementing real structural change.
POLICY OPTIONS
Given the inefficiencies of the government’s 
policies of the past five years, in the post-election 
period, they must set aside electoral sentiments 
and rhetoric, seriously assess their programs and 
dare introduce clear changes thus proposing new 
solutions to the problems facing the country.
Inflation problems or price increases and their 
solutions must be viewed within an expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policy that puts the focus on 
economic growth, job creation and improvements 
in the population’s standard of living.
Assuming the incumbent president is re-elected, 
he will have the opportunity to make good on 
his election promises and remove the obstacles 
to economic growth – corruption, nepotism and 
monopolies.
In 2013, Armenia may be offered significant 
assistance opportunities – the possible convening 
of an EU Donor Conference, and the re-start of 
the Millennium Challenge Program. In the pre-
election, election and post-election periods, 
Armenia’s authorities must do everything possible 
to meet the conditions required to receive those 
opportunities so that those funds flow into 
Armenia’s economy.
The EU Association Agreement as well the Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement must 
be concluded. This process cannot be allowed to 
impact the tough decision it faces regarding the 
Eurasian Union.
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ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN GEORGIA
GDP Growth: 
6.2 percent
Inflation 
(annual 
average):  
2.4 percent
GDP:  
$10.2 bn
GDP per 
capita: 
$3036
Population: 
3.0 m*
GDP Growth: 
3.9 percent
Inflation 
(annual 
average):  
3.0 percent
GDP:  
$71.0 bn
GDP per 
capita: 
$7727
Population: 
9.2 m
GDP Growth: 
6.5 percent
Inflation 
(annual 
average):  
0.2 percent
GDP:  
$15.8 bn
GDP per 
capita: 
$3514
Population: 
4.5 m
The Armenian president’s 
probable re-election will 
introduce new questions. 
The nature and make-up 
of the government, its 
inclusion or exclusion 
of the four parties not 
in coalition at the end 
of 2012, whether any of 
those parties will join 
the new government and 
form a new coalition, all 
these will determine the 
nature of government 
and opposition relations. 
Armenia’s main economic 
challenge will remain to 
overcome the already en-
trenched elite economic 
interests. Expectations 
from the public will be 
high given the pre-elec-
tion period promises and 
the free hand a second 
term president has. 
On the foreign policy 
front, Armenia will face 
two major challenges. 
By year’s end, after the 
conclusion of both Ar-
menia’s and Azerbaijan’s 
presidential elections, 
the co-chair countries 
will be more assertive in 
expecting movement on 
the Karabakh resolution 
process. Armenia will 
be confronted with the 
need to make a clear 
choice between European 
integration and Eurasian 
Union membership.
Georgia will be in a very 
precarious situation. 
On the one hand, they 
reaped the benefits of 
changing a government, 
through a representa-
tive ballot. The events 
that followed however, 
including persecution of 
the previous leadership, 
can reverse the positive 
sentiment. Precisely for 
this reason, it’s too early 
to count Saakashvili out. 
Much depends on Ivanish-
vili’s handling of the con-
tradictory and extreme 
expectations.  The main 
foreign policy agenda 
item will remain Georgia-
Russia relations. On the 
one hand, there is the 
opportunity to reset the 
relationship. On the other 
hand, there is a danger of 
domestic backlash if the 
reset takes place at the 
expense of serious com-
promises on the Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia issues. 
NATO and EU relations, 
in light of this reset, will 
become more challenging 
and will require a serious 
balancing act.
The outcome of the 
Azerbaijan presiden-
tial election is almost a 
foregone conclusion. But 
during the year, Azer-
baijan will be under the 
international spotlight. 
Domestic human rights 
and other issues will 
be highlighted; the op-
position, although tiny, 
will gather momentum 
and attract attention, 
suppression will be more 
consequential. 
With a more optimis-
tic global economic 
forecast, oil prices will 
remain high, from which 
Azerbaijan will benefit, 
although future expecta-
tions have been down-
graded. Azerbaijan will 
have a second term in 
the Security Council and 
will continue to use that 
seat to promote its posi-
tions on Karabakh, but as 
in the past, with no great 
impact.  Karabakh will 
remain the top foreign 
policy agenda item for 
Azerbaijan, and election-
year means both a 
buildup in both military 
capacity and rhetoric.  
Azerbaijan-Iran tensions 
will be exacerbated, with 
toughening on the nucle-
ar issue. Azerbaijan may 
choose a position further 
threatening to Iran. 
* Armenia’s population figure is based on the 2011 census conducted by the National Statistical Service of Armenia.
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RUSSIA TURKEY IRAN
GDP Growth: 
3.7 percent
Inflation 
(annual 
average):  
5.1 percent
GDP: 
$1953.6 bn
GDP per 
capita: 
$13765
Population: 
141.9 m
GDP Growth: 
3.0 percent
Inflation 
(annual 
average):  
8.7 percent
GDP:  
$783.1 bn
GDP per 
capita: 
$10457
Population: 
74.9 m
GDP Growth: 
-0.9 percent
Inflation 
(annual 
average): 
25.2 percent
GDP:  
$483.8 bn
GDP per 
capita: 
$6356
Population: 
76.1 m
Optimistic economic 
projections will keep 
oil prices high, reduce 
the need for economic 
reforms, and will further 
embolden Putin in his 
third term in the presi-
dency. This return for a 
longer hold on power on 
the one hand raised dis-
content internally and on 
the other hand came with 
expectations of change. 
Same-leadership fatigue is 
visible, regardless of actu-
al actions, which will lead 
to declining popularity, 
and in response, efforts to 
introduce greater social 
and economic opportuni-
ties. The noisy start of 
his return, and the lack 
of reform prospects will 
continue to aggravate 
civil engagement and civil 
rights.
Relations with Armenia 
will, to some extent, be 
conditioned by Armenia’s 
handling of the Eurasia 
Union membership issue. 
Given the unevenness in 
Armenia-Russia rela-
tions, the absence of a 
warm personal relation-
ship between the leaders 
will impact the broader 
relationship between the 
two countries.  Putin will 
maintain a much more 
cautious and less engaged 
position regarding Kara-
bakh than Medvedev’s 
unprecedented nearly 
dozen trilateral meetings.
The Erdogan-led Justice 
and Development Party 
will enter its tenth year, 
attempting to continue 
with the impressive 
economic development, 
which over this decade 
brought Turkey from 
40th to 17th place.  In-
ternally, the Kurdish issue 
is most important. Given 
regional reconfigurations, 
the Turkish leadership 
will continue with new 
attempts at negotiation. 
However, the Kurds are 
emboldened by political 
and economic successes 
in Iraq and Syria, making 
them more influential. 
The failed zero-problems-
with-neighbors policy 
will continue to impact 
relations with Armenia. 
Turkey will continue 
to tie Armenia-Turkey 
relations to Karabakh. 
Constitutional change 
will remain an issue and 
Erdogan will continue to 
strive for a more powerful 
presidential seat in the 
2014 election.
With Ahmadinejad’s step-
ping down, as determined 
by the Constitution, a 
new, less contentious 
president which may alle-
viate some of the interna-
tional tensions. This could 
be Iran’s opportunity to 
renegotiate the nuclear 
issues. The new presi-
dent will be the target 
of greater expectations 
regarding the economic 
decline and deprecia-
tion of the currency. Any 
improvement in Iran’s 
relations with the West 
will benefit Armenia. 
Iran will be more atten-
tive to regional projects, 
especially affecting those 
stalled with Armenia. 
International pressure 
on Iran will continue, 
despite developments in 
the nuclear issue. Given 
the choices it has made in 
its Middle East alliances, 
especially in light of 
developments with its ally 
Syria, tensions with the 
West will continue.
Data is from “World Economic Outlook: Coping with High Debt and Sluggish Growth”, IMF, October 2012. 
Source: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/pdf/text.pdf 
Armenia-related data was later revised by IMF.
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